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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation studies the potential paradoxical effects of alliance participation. 
Over the past two decades, alliance participation has become a popular firm strategy to 
obtain benefits that are difficult for a firm to obtain on its own. Yet, as firms increasingly 
participate in alliances, boundedly rational managers may not effectively manage all aspects 
of alliances to achieve intended alliance outcomes. Paradoxically, alliance participation may 
cause harm to the participating firms. 
To unveil an alliance paradox, this dissertation first examined the relationships 
between alliance portfolio attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, multilateral alliances, 
alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type) and customer service quality in the U.S. 
airline industry. Further, I examined whether alliance experience moderates the relationships 
between alliance portfolio attributes and customer service quality. Altogether, five hypotheses 
were tested.  
This dissertation relied exclusively on the longitudinal quarterly data of nine U.S. 
major airlines over a 20-year period between 1988 and 2007 that include Alaska Airlines, 
American Airlines, America West, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, United Airlines, 
and U.S. Airways. Data pertaining to alliance variables were collected from the Securities 
Data Company (SDC) database. Quarterly service quality data pertaining to customer 
complaint, mishandled baggage, on-time arrival, and involuntary denied boarding were 
collected from the Air Travel Consumer Report published by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT). To detect the temporal effects of alliance portfolio attributes on 
service quality, a three-month lag was created between the alliances data and the service 
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 quality data.  
The results show that although the relationship between alliance portfolio attributes 
and service quality seems to be more complex than initially proposed, the overall finding 
confirms the existence of an alliance paradox in that increases in alliance portfolio size, 
partner country diversity and channel-dominated alliances (versus backward 
competitor-dominated alliances) are associated with decreases in certain key dimensions of 
service quality.  
This dissertation seeks to make several important contributions. First, by exploring 
the alliance paradox, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate that despite the anticipated 
alliance benefits such as cost reduction or revenue enhancement, managers need to be aware 
of the cost of alliance participation with respect to customer service quality, which has 
paramount impact on firm performance. Second, this dissertation also contributes to services 
marketing literature by investigating alliance portfolio attributes as antecedents of service 
quality. Third, this dissertation investigates whether firm-level alliance experience moderates 
the relationship between alliance portfolio attributes and service quality.  
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most important strategic decisions that managers often have to make is: 
what is the most effective form of organizing certain activities? Managers typically have 
three broad organizational forms to choose from: market, hierarchy, and alliances. Market 
refers to transactional exchanges that occur in the arm’s length spot market. Hierarchy 
occurs when a firm integrates activities into its own organizational boundary, either 
through internal development, or mergers and acquisitions. Alliances, defined as 
voluntary ongoing interfirm agreements (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002), are an 
intermediate organizational form between market and hierarchy.   
Early inquiries of appropriate organizational forms focused primarily on the 
dichotomous choice of market versus hierarchy. As early as 1937, in his classic essay 
entitled “the nature of the firm,” Ronald Coase, a Nobel laureate economist, brought up a 
puzzle: “[I]f markets are so effective, then why do firms ever exist? And, if firms exist 
because they are in fact better than market at allocating resources, then why is the 
economy not organized into a single huge firm?” (Silverman, 2002, p. 468). Coase argues 
that the choice of market versus hierarchy is determined by transaction costs.  
Drawing on Coase’ work, Oliver Williamson (1979) developed Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE) theory. Premised on the assumptions of bounded rationality and 
behavioral opportunism, TCE postulates that the three specific characteristics of a 
transaction — uncertainty, frequency, and asset-specificity — affect managers’ choice of 
organizational form. For instance, when exchange hazards are low (i.e., low uncertainty, 
low frequency and/or low asset specificity), market exchange is the appropriate form of 
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 organization because it involves lowest transaction costs. In contrast, when exchange 
hazards are high, hierarchy is the appropriate form of organization because the associated 
transaction costs are lowest. 
Over the past two decades, alliance participation has become an attractive 
organizational strategy to enhance firm performance. It is evidenced by the explosive 
growth of alliance formations. Das and Teng (1999) noted that alliance formation has 
been increasing at the rate of 25% every year since 1985. Anand and Khanna (2000) 
reported that approximately 20,000 alliances were formed worldwide within two years in 
the late 1990s. This enthusiasm for alliances stems from the benefits that are difficult for 
firms to obtain on their own. Some of the benefits include market entry, cost reductions, 
and increased market competitiveness (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).  
Consider the alliance formed between America West and Continental in 1995. 
This alliance allowed both airlines to code share. Code sharing is defined as “a 
commercial agreement between two [or more] airlines under which an airline operating a 
service allows another airline to offer that service to the traveling public under its own 
flight designator, even though it does not operate the service” (Rhoades & Lush, 1997, p. 
109). Participating in code sharing alliances enabled both airlines to increase revenues 
through expanded market scope, enhance passenger benefits, and reduce costs through 
sharing airport facilities. First, this alliance allowed both airlines to increase revenue 
through market expansion. Under the code sharing agreement, America West sold a 
Continental flight under America West’s name (i.e., designator code) as if America West 
operated that flight, and vice versa. Both airlines accessed a broader market without 
operating their own aircrafts in the extended market. Often cited as an alliance success 
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 model, this alliance was said to generate approximately $40 million for Continental and 
$30 million for America West in revenues each year (McCartney, 1998). 
Second, the America West-Continental alliance also enhanced both airlines’ 
revenues because of their enhanced customer benefits, making other airlines competing 
on the same routes unpopular. The America West-Continental alliance provided at least 
two important benefits to their customers. First, by taking the allied flights, passengers 
could have a seamless travel experience, i.e., reaching more destinations with one ticket 
and without the trouble of re-checking baggage at connections. Second, passengers 
obtained enhanced frequent flier program benefits by flying the allied routes. America 
West’s frequent fliers could earn miles on Continental’s routes (e.g., Europe), where 
America West did not fly to on its own. As a result, Southwest lost its customers to the 
America West-Continental alliance and had to reduce its capacity between Phoenix (the 
base of America West) and Houston (the base of Continental) by 10% in 1996 and 1997 
(McCartney, 1998). 
Third, this alliance reduced both airlines’ costs through sharing activities. Facility 
sharing is a very common practice of airline alliances because economies of scale can be 
obtained by sharing economic activities to reduce the production costs per unit. Airline 
alliances often reduce costs through airport facility sharing, joint advertising and 
promotion, and joint purchase of products and services. For example, Star alliance (a 
large airline alliance) began sharing electronic ticketing services among its 15 airline 
members in 2005. This service eliminated unnecessary operating procedures between 
airline alliance partners and reduced ticketing costs up to $7 per ticket (Kleymann & 
Seristö, 2004). Given the benefits of cost reduction, America West and Continental also 
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 shared their activities, such as joint ticketing and baggage handling at many airports.  
Alliance participation seems to be an excellent strategy to enhance firm 
performance. Yet, alliance management is difficult and time consuming (White & Lui, 
2005; Ireland et al., 2002) because providing “seamless” travel services requires 
“seamless” coordination and cooperation between alliance partners. On one hand, 
alliance partners are independent entities after alliance formation in that there is no 
hierarchical authority involved between partners and each partner retains its own 
organizational autonomy. On the other hand, partners are also interdependent because 
each partner’s cooperation is needed to accomplish the alliance tasks (Inkpen, 2001). This 
interplay of independence and interdependence demands substantial organizational 
flexibility, managerial time and effort to manage alliances. However, since managers are 
only boundedly rational (March & Simon, 1958), they are limited in their available time 
and effort. Despite their best effort, as the alliance activities become more complex, 
boundedly rational managers may fail to effectively manage alliances.  
 The America West-Continental alliance backfired because the complexity 
involved in managing the interdependent alliance tasks performed by independent airlines 
led to a tremendous drop in service quality (McCartney, 1998). This alliance was 
intended to provide “seamless” travel experience for passengers so that customers did not 
need to re-check baggage at connections and could use one ticket to travel on partners’ 
flight; unfortunately, the expected “seamless” travel experience turned out to be a 
“bumpy” ride for several reasons. First, airlines are inherently hierarchical organizations 
with many system constraints and are not structurally flexible enough to change. Gregory 
Brenneman, Continental's president and chief operating officer, said, "It’s hard to go out 
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 and change your system and move employees around that's what creates heartburn and 
slows implementation down"(McCartney, 1998, p.B.1). Due to the limited availability of 
gates at each concourse at Phoenix airport, it took quite a while for Continental and 
America West to be able to operate from the same concourse at that airport. Also, When 
America West sold tickets to Hawaii on Continental, the two airlines could not operate 
from the same gate in the same terminal at Los Angeles International Airport. Such 
structural constraints created enormous confusion at the airports. Passengers checked in 
at one concourse, but later found that their flight departed from a different concourse on a 
different airline. Their baggage was handled by a different airline without their prior 
knowledge, or even worse, their baggage was lost.  
Second, the required interfirm coordination may further tax the efforts and limited 
available time of the already busy airline managers because simply putting each other’s 
flight numbers on their own flights did not mean that their computer systems would 
readily coordinate. Third, unlike R & D alliances in high-tech industries, airline alliances 
are unique in that they involve the entire organization to jointly produce the service 
experience, rather than just one group of employees. Regrettably, there is a general lack 
of cooperation by the employees at both airlines. In Houston, Continental ground workers 
often gave their flights preferential treatment over those of America West. In return, 
America West’s treated Continental’s flight with similar attitude in Phoenix. 
Consequently, the number of flight delays, late arrivals, flight cancellations and consumer 
complaints of both airlines soared (McCartney, 1998). Despite the financial benefits to 
both airlines and potential customer benefits, the alliance was terminated because the 
alliance benefits did not outweigh the problems incurred.  
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 This America West-Continental alliance failure indicates the potential existence of 
a strategy paradox surrounding the relationships between alliance participation and 
customer service quality. Strategy paradox occurs when “the same behaviors and 
characteristics that maximize a firm’s probability of notable success also maximize its 
probability of total failure” (Raynor, 2007, p. 2). Lewis (2000) stated that “paradox 
denotes contradictory yet interrelated elements—elements that seem logical in isolation, 
but absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” (p. 760). 
An example of a strategy paradox is the 3M’s efficiency-innovation paradox. In 
2000 when Mr. James McNerne, the former GE executive, took over 3M’s helm as its 
CEO, he immediately adopted GE’s Six Sigma model to reduce costs and improve 
efficiency at 3M. Shortly after the implementation of the efficiency oriented Six Sigma, 
3M’s operating costs were considerably reduced, profits increased, and even the stock 
market price rose. However, some unintended effect happened—the product innovations 
miserably suffered because Six Sigma slashed investments in R & D programs and 
changed its innovative culture. Before the implementation of Six Sigma, one third of 
3M’s sales came from new products released in the past five years. A few years after Six 
Sigma was adopted, this ratio dropped to one-quarter. The board and managers were 
worried about the negative impact of Six Sigma on 3M’s innovation-oriented 
organizational culture. Mr. George Buckley, 3M’s new CEO, said  
[I]nvention is by its very nature a disorderly process…You can't put a Six Sigma 
process into that area and say, well, I'm getting behind on invention, so I'm going 
to schedule myself for three good ideas on Wednesday and two on Friday. That's 
not how creativity works. (Hindo, 2007, p.9)   
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Recently, 3M reinvigorated its innovative culture by reversing course the application of 
Six Sigma. 
This efficiency-innovation paradox at 3M is analogous to the alliance paradox 
investigated in this dissertation in that expecting the various alliance benefits, managers 
are increasingly using alliances to improve organizational performance. Paradoxically, by 
doing the things that are logical and rational in isolation, managers may unwittingly set 
themselves up for other unintended or disappointing organizational outcomes. It is of 
paramount importance to study strategy paradoxes to help both researchers and 
practitioners to understand the complexity of multifaceted alliance participation 
decisions.  
Focus, Research Questions and Research Methodology 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to unveil the paradoxical effects of alliance 
participation. As opposed to the general notion that alliance participation increases firm 
performance, this dissertation studies the downsides of alliance participation by 
examining the relationship between alliance portfolio attributes and service quality in the 
U.S. airline industry. In his recent book entitled “Strategy Paradox,” Raynor (2007, p. 3) 
stated that “the reason most business research misses the strategy paradox is that few 
studies ever examine failure.” Even though alliance research has investigated alliance 
failure (see Arino & de la Torre, 1998; Parkhe, 1993), those studies have focused 
exclusively on the direct effects of alliance failure on the participating firms. Instead, this 
study focuses on the detrimental effects of alliance failures on customers.  
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 Customers are an important but most ignored stakeholder in organizational 
research. Peter Drucker (1974) stated that the ultimate goal of any organization is to 
create a customer. Unfortunately, Brief (2003, p. 187) stated that “a piece is missing that 
should receive significant attention by management and organization researchers: the 
consumer.” Recently, scholars noted the importance of bringing customers into 
management research in that neglecting the customer is incomplete for assessing 
competitive asymmetries (DeSarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006), understanding the value 
creation process (Priem, 2007) and in identifying sources of sustainable competitive 
advantages (Adner & Zemsky, 2006). Srivastava, Fahey and Christensen (2001) 
suggested that creating and sustaining customer value lead to sustainable competitive 
advantage. Given the importance of customers, the fact that alliance research has paid 
little attention to customers leaves an important gap in the alliance research. Even in 
marketing literature where customers are a central research topic, scholars have lamented 
that the empirical research examining the alliance effects on customers is “scant at best” 
(Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003).  
Shifting attention to the customers, this dissertation studies the paradoxical effects 
of alliance portfolio attributes on service quality in the U.S. airline industry. An alliance 
portfolio refers to all the existing alliances a firm simultaneously manages (Hoffmann, 
2007). Since organizations are increasingly embedded in a collection of alliances, it is 
important to understand how a firm can effectively structure its alliance portfolio. Even 
though research on individual alliance management still warrants further investigation, 
research on alliance portfolio management will enhance our understanding of the 
complexity in simultaneously managing a bundle of alliances (Gulati, 1998), because the 
8 
 
 effects of alliance participation on firm performance depend more on the firm’s capability 
in managing its portfolio of alliances than its success or failure in managing one or two 
alliances (Hoffmann, 2007).  
Service quality, the dependent variable in this study, is the “single most 
researched area in services marketing to date” (Brown, Fisk, & Bitner, 1994, p. 33). 
Extensive marketing studies suggest that service quality is positively related to customers’ 
behavioral intentions (see Cronin, Brady & Hult, 2000; Olorunniwo, Hsu & Udo, 2006; 
Sanchez, Abad, Carrillo & Fernandez, 2007; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996). As 
a result, provision of quality services improves the financial performance of firms (see 
Aaker & Jacobson, 1994; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; Rust, Inman, Jia, & Zahorik, 1999; 
Rust, Moorman & Dickson, 2002).  
In the context of this study, provision of quality services is particularly important 
in the U.S. airline industry because inferior services may receive not only negative 
customer responses, but also government punishments. The U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) collects information of important service quality dimensions and 
publishes airline service quality reports on a monthly basis. In an interview, disappointed 
by a drop in airline service quality (e.g., increased flight delays and baggage losses), John 
Mica, the chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, said “they [the airlines] can do 
better and must do better, and if they don’t do better, Congress has authority to wield a 
big stick” (McCartney, 2006, p. D.5). He even suggested that passengers sue the airlines 
if the airlines did not live up to their customer service commitment (McCartney, 2006). 
The U.S. airline industry provides a natural setting for this study for several 
important reasons. First, airlines have enthusiastically sought an impressive number of 
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 and different forms of alliances, which differ greatly along the value chain, such as 
alliances with hotels, car rental companies and other airlines. This variety of airline 
alliances makes possible the empirical testing of the variables of interest. Second, the U.S. 
airline industry provides rich archival longitudinal data sources that make this study 
possible. Third, since the major U.S. airlines are at least dominant-business firms (Rumelt, 
1974), the confounding effects of diversified corporate effects on the customer service 
quality are less likely to be a concern because an airline’s revenues come primarily from 
the passenger transportation business (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). 
This research builds on the premise that effective alliance management requires a 
great deal of time commitment and effort by managers to manage alliances in selecting 
appropriate partners, adapting to, monitoring, coordinating, and controlling the alliance 
activities. But boundedly rational managers are constrained by their limited time and 
efforts (March & Simon, 1958), as alliance management complexities rise, the managers’ 
capability in effectively managing alliances to provide quality services may decrease.  
Most of the research on alliance management capability investigates whether 
some firms are more capable of managing alliances than others and what factors 
contribute to such variances in alliance management capability. Researchers have found 
that alliance management capability is a path dependent capability and that firms may 
learn to effectively manage alliances from their previous alliance experience (Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2006). In particular, in the context of the U.S. airline industry, managers may 
benefit from their previous alliance experience. For example, Continental expected that 
its upcoming alliance with Northwest would be smooth because of the learning from its 
previous alliance experience with America West. In an interview about Continental’s 
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upcoming alliance formation with Northwest, Mr. Gregory Brenneman, the Continental’s 
president and chief operating officer, said “when we started with America West, we were 
earning our bachelor’s degrees…Today, we have our Ph.D.s” (McCartney, 1998, p. B.1).  
A conceptual model is presented in Figure 1 to first examine the main effects of 
the four portfolio attributes on service quality: alliance portfolio size, multilateral 
alliances, alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type. These alliance portfolio 
attributes are selected to answer four important questions: (1) does a firm’s alliance 
portfolio size affect its service quality? (2) does the proportion of multilateral alliances in 
a firm’s alliance portfolio affect its service quality? (3) does a firm’s partner country 
diversity of its alliance portfolio affect its service quality? and (4) do different types of 
alliances in a firm’s alliance portfolio affect its service quality? Drawing on the bounded 
rationality argument, these four attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, multilateral 
alliances, partner country diversity, and alliance type) are proposed as complicating 
factors that require more of the managers’ time and effort. Hence, these four attributes are 
hypothesized to be negatively related to customer service quality.  
Further, drawing on the recent research on alliance management capability 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), I examine whether firms with 
more alliance experience are more effective in managing alliances to provide quality 
services. Hence, firm-level alliance experience is included in the model as a moderator 
and is proposed to alleviate the negative effects of alliance portfolio size and multilateral 
alliances on service quality. 
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H3: Partner Country Diversity (-)  
 
H4: Alliance Type (backward 
competitor-dominated alliance ratio is 
less negatively related to customer 
service quality than channel-dominated 
alliance ratio) 
 
H1: Alliance Portfolio Size (-) 
 
H2: Multilateral Alliance (-)  
 
H5(a,b): 
Alliance 
Experience 
(Experience 
with alliances) 
(+) 
Customer Service Quality* 
1. Customer complaint 
2. Mishandled baggage 
3. On-time arrival 
4. Involuntary denied 
boarding 
*Each dimension is tested independently 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Alliance Portfolio Effects 
on Service Quality 
 
 
 This dissertation relied on a sample of nine U.S. major airlines, using longitudinal 
data over a 20-year period between 1988 and 2007. The alliance data were collected from 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database. To test the temporal effects of alliance 
formation on service quality, the service quality data were collected with a three-month 
lag after the alliance data from reports published by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT). 
Expected Contributions 
 
This dissertation seeks to make three important contributions. First, this 
dissertation contributes to alliance research by exploring the potential dark side of alliance 
participation. In general, the preponderance of alliance research suggests that alliance 
participation, on average, creates value to the participating firms. Expecting the benefits 
that are difficult to obtain on their own, firms have enthusiastically sought alliances to 
enhance firm performance over the past two decades. Both in academic research and 
popular press, the general notion that alliance participation benefits participating firms is 
well received. Yet, managing interdependent alliance activities performed by independent 
firms to produce and deliver products/services creates substantial alliance management 
complexity. Since managers are limited in their available time and effort, as the alliance 
tasks become more complex, boundedly rational managers may fail to effectively manage 
alliances and end up with disappointing consequences on firm performance. This 
dissertation attempts to demonstrate that despite the potential alliance benefits, as the 
alliance task scope, alliance task depth and partner diversity increase in a firm’s alliance 
portfolio, the resultant alliance management complexity may overtax the managerial time 
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 and effort, thus causing harm to firm performance. In unveiling this potential alliance 
paradox, this dissertation may inform practicing managers of the unintended alliance 
effects on customer service quality, which is a very important organizational performance 
outcome. Thus, when managers make alliance participation decisions, they should also 
consider the service quality issues.  
Second, this dissertation also contributes to services marketing literature by 
investigating alliance portfolio attributes as antecedents to service quality. To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first empirical study to date that investigates the alliance 
portfolio effects on service quality. While the services and marketing research has studied 
the antecedents of customer service quality mostly at consumer level, employee level, 
and firm level and primarily relied on survey data, this dissertation uses longitudinal 
archival data to extend service literature by investigating the effects of alliance portfolio 
attributes. 
Third, I intend to show that firms learn from their prior alliance experience to 
reduce alliance management complexity, thus alleviating the negative impacts of alliance 
management complexity on service quality. Previous alliance management capability 
research suggests that alliance experience improves alliance performance (Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005). However, little is known about whether alliance experience matters in 
term of customer service quality. This dissertation also intends to fill this knowledge gap. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
The following section describes the organization of this dissertation and provides 
a summary of each chapter. 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
The overall objective of chapter 1 is to provide an overview of this dissertation. 
This chapter first discusses the potential paradoxical effects of alliance participation on 
service quality. Then, it provides a brief introduction of the research focus, research 
questions and research methodology. The conceptual model is presented in Figure 1. 
Potential contributions are also discussed. 
 
Chapter two: Literature review 
By reviewing pertinent literature, the primary objectives of this chapter are to 
provide a foundation for the subsequent hypotheses development and research 
methodology, and to discuss the nature of the airline alliance paradox. This chapter 
consists of four sections, which are (1) a brief literature review of alliance literature, (2) a 
brief literature review of service quality, (3) a discussion of the airline alliance paradox, 
and (4) a chapter summary.  
The first section reviews alliance research on alliance formation, alliance 
performance, and alliance management. The alliance formation review briefly addresses 
the question of why firms participate in alliances. The alliance performance review 
investigates the extent to which alliance literature has studied outcome variables related 
to customer services. The alliance management review focuses on the topics related to 
alliance management complexity and alliance experience.  
The service quality review section first illustrates why studying service quality is 
important. Then, it identifies two knowledge gaps that this dissertation intends to fill. The 
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 first knowledge gap pertains to data and management in that the majority of extant 
service quality research has relied primarily on the perceptual measures, using survey 
data, while little research has used longitudinal archival data. The second knowledge gap 
pertains to the lack of research on the alliance effects on service quality.    
The third section focuses on airline alliance paradox. It first discusses the 
definition of paradoxes, the importance of studying paradoxes, and then discusses the 
nature of the airline alliance paradox studied in this study. At the end of the chapter, a 
short summary is presented. 
 
Chapter three: Research hypotheses 
This chapter provides detailed discussions of each hypothesized relationship. The 
main effects of four alliance portfolio attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, alliance type, 
multilateral alliances, and alliance partner country diversity) are first hypothesized. Then, 
firms with more general alliance experience are hypothesized to have higher capability in 
managing alliances. Altogether, five hypotheses are proposed. 
 
Chapter four: Research method 
Chapter 4 consists of two sections: data collection and hypotheses testing. The 
first section describes the detailed procedure of data collection and measurement and 
coding of the dependent variable, independent variables, moderating variable, and control 
variables. In the second section, specific statistical procedures to test the hypotheses and 
test results are presented.  
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 Chapter five: Discussion 
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, it provides a discussion of results 
reported in chapter 4. The second section discusses the limitations of this dissertation and 
implications for future research. The third section discusses the implications for managers. 
The last section provides the conclusion of this dissertation.  
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 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
By reviewing the pertinent literature, the purposes of this chapter are to justify the 
need to unveil the alliance paradox, provide theoretical foundations for advancing 
hypotheses presented in Figure 1, and provide rationale for the methodology employed in 
this dissertation (i.e., use of longitudinal archival data). The literature review is organized 
into four sections: alliance, service quality, airline alliance paradox and a summary. 
The review of alliance literature revolves around three questions. The first 
question is concerned with, why do firms form alliances? To answer this question, the 
dominant theoretical frameworks and the relevant empirical studies are briefly reviewed. 
The second question focuses on the extent to which the alliance literature has studied the 
relationships between alliance participation and service quality. The third question asks, 
how can firms effectively manage alliances? To answer this question, the alliance 
literature pertaining to alliance management challenges and alliance experience is 
reviewed. 
The review of service quality literature discusses the importance of service quality, 
and identifies the knowledge gaps pertaining to data and measurement of service quality 
and the antecedents of service quality. This review of service quality literature intends to 
(1) justify the approach of measuring customer service quality used in this dissertation 
and explain the advantages of using longitudinal archival data; and (2) suggest that little 
service quality research has investigated the alliance variables as antecedents of service 
quality. 
The third section of this literature review is concerned with airline alliance 
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 paradox. This section first defines paradoxes, discusses the importance of studying 
paradoxes, and then discusses the nature of the airline alliance paradox. At the end of the 
chapter, a chapter summary is provided. 
A Brief Review of Alliance Literature 
 
For clarity, definitions of alliances, multilateral alliances, alliance networks and 
alliance portfolios are warranted, because these terms are closely related but distinct 
constructs. Alliances refer to “cooperative arrangements between two or more firms to 
improve their competitive position and performance by sharing resources” (Ireland, Hitt 
& Vaidyanath, 2002, p. 413). Alliances encompass a broad range of interfirm 
collaborations such as joint ventures, licensing agreements, research and development 
projects, joint purchasing, and manufacturing activities (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994).  
An alliance can be further classified as a bilateral or a multilateral alliance based 
on the number of partners involved in an alliance. A bilateral alliance is characterized 
with dyadic interfirm collaborations between two partners. In contrast, a multilateral 
alliance involves at least three alliance partners. Some scholars also use multiparty 
alliances (Zeng & Chen, 2003), multifirm alliances (Hwang & Burgers, 1997), and 
alliance constellations (Das & Teng, 2002; Lazzarini, 2007) to refer to multilateral 
alliances. This distinction between bilateral and multilateral alliances is important, 
because bilateral and multilateral alliances differ substantially with respect to alliance 
management complexities such as governance complexity, coordination costs, transaction 
uncertainty, degree of opportunism, and payoff structures (Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Das 
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 & Teng, 2002; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
Recently, academic attention has shifted from single alliance management to 
alliance portfolio management. Hoffman (2007) argued that the effects of a firm’s 
alliance strategy do not simply depend on the success or failure of managing one or two 
alliances but on the success of failure of its bundle of alliances. While both bilateral and 
multilateral alliances describe single alliances, scholars use ‘alliance network’ and 
‘alliance portfolio’ to describe multiple alliances. An alliance network is a set of alliances 
connected by a focal firm (Jarrilo, 1988). Since network ties and tie strengths are not the 
focus of this dissertation, I use ‘alliance portfolio,’ which is similar to the concept of 
egocentric alliance network, to refer to all the existing alliances the focal firm has 
(Hoffman, 2007). 
The next section briefly reviews the literature on alliance formation. Since there 
are several excellent comprehensive literature reviews on alliance formation (for reviews, 
see Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002), a brief 
review is given on how the dominant organizational theories—transaction cost economics, 
resource dependence theory, institutional theory, resource based view, learning theory, 
and strategic behavior—relate to alliance formation.  
Alliance formation 
 
Few managerial decisions are as important as the choices of appropriate 
organizational forms. That is, where certain organizational activities should be carried out: 
whether an activity should be (1) performed in the arm’s length market exchange (i.e., 
market); (2) internalized within organizational boundary through internal development, or 
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 through merger and acquisition (i.e., hierarchy); or (3) jointly performed through 
alliances. Hierarchy uses authority to create and coordinate the organizational activities. 
Market suggests that activities are performed and coordinated between the supplier and 
buyers by the price mechanism (Adler, 2001). Alliances are an intermediate 
organizational form between hierarchy and market such that firms are independent 
entities after alliance formation thus activities are not coordinated through internal 
authority; and also firms are interdependent on each other to perform the activities which 
price mechanisms are not sufficient to coordinate.  
In the past two decades, alliances, the intermediate form of organization, have 
become increasingly popular. In the following section, the alliance literature on the 
determinants of alliance formation is presented.  
 
Transaction cost economics 
Based on Coase’s work, Oliver Williamson (1979, 1985) developed transaction 
cost economics (TCE) into “one of the most prominent and influential developments in 
the social sciences” (David & Han, 2004, p. 39). Predicated on the assumptions of 
behavioral opportunism and bounded rationality, TCE postulates that the exchange 
hazards arising from transaction costs–asset specificity, uncertainty, and 
frequency—determine the choice of organizational form among market, hierarchy, and 
hybrid (e.g., alliances). High asset specificity of a transaction occurs when the assets in a 
transaction are valued much lower if they are redeployed outside the transaction 
relationship. The level of environmental uncertainty is positively related to performance 
hazards. Frequent transactions require high monitoring costs. TCE predicts, for example, 
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 that transactions with low asset specificity should be performed in market, transactions 
with intermediate asset specificity in hybrid form (e.g., alliances), and transactions with 
high asset specificity in hierarchy (David & Han, 2004).  
 
Agency theory 
Due to the separation of ownership and control between the managers and 
shareholders, agency theory seeks to explain why managers’ choices of organizational 
forms arise from agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise 
from information asymmetry, monitoring problems and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Information asymmetry occurs when the managers have more information than others. 
Monitoring problems refer to the difficulties in observing and evaluating the managers’ 
performance. Moral hazards occur when the goals of self-interested managers and their 
level of risk taking propensity differ from those of shareholders. Scholars have used 
agency perspectives to investigate how agency problems influence the managerial 
decisions in participating in alliances. For example, Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) 
investigated whether the composition of a firm’s alliance portfolio can be explained by 
agency variables. On a sample of over 300 U.S. manufacturing firms, they found support 
for their agency prediction such that when the internal officers and directors own lower 
level of the focal firm’s equity, the alliance portfolio tends to be more extensive.  
 
Resource based view 
In contrast to TCE, which focuses on transaction cost minimization, resource 
based view explains alliance formations are motivated by profit maximization (Colombo, 
22 
 
 2003; Das & Teng, 2000; Lavie, 2006). According to resource based view, when a firm 
possesses valuable, rare, difficult-to-imitable, and non-substitutable resources and 
capabilities, it is expected to obtain sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). 
Alliance participation allows firms to “locate the optimal resource configuration in which 
the value of their resources is maximized relative to other possible combinations” 
(Ireland et al., 2002, p. 427). To configure optimal resources, research has examined 
whether alliance formation decisions are influenced by the resource stocks and 
capabilities of both the focal firm and of its potential partners (Stuart, 2000). For example, 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) found that the more industry employers the top 
managers have in the past, the more alliances the top managers’ current firm has. Hitt et 
al. (2000) found that in emerging economies, firms tend to form alliances with firms that 
possessed more financial assets and higher technological capabilities.  
  
Learning theory 
Learning has become a popular organizational theory to explain firm behaviors 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991). Interfirm learning is another important 
rationale for alliance formation. Interfirm learning refers to “any addition to a firm’s set 
of capabilities obtained through interaction with alliance partners” (Colombo, 2003, p. 
1212). For example, Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) found that on a sample of 325 
biotechnology firms, firms explore learning opportunities in new product development 
stage by forming R & D alliances, but sought exploitation alliances (e.g., clinical trials) to 
further learn about market development. 
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 Resource dependence theory 
From a sociological, open system perspective, resource dependence theory posits 
that firms form alliances to manage their dependencies on the external resources (Pfeffer 
& Salancik,1978). Firms are in constant exchange of resources with the external 
environment to support their operations. During such resource exchanges, power 
imbalances occur due to the differences in the level of resource dependences among the 
parties. Alliance participation provides opportunities to increase a focal firm’s power in 
its exchange with the external environment by increasing other firms’ dependence on the 
focal firm, and decreasing its own dependence on other firms. For example, Gulati and 
Gargiulo (1999) found that as the level of resource interdependence between firms grew, 
the possibility of alliances formation increased.  
 
Institutional theory 
Also rooted in sociology, different from economic explanations of alliance 
formation (e.g., TCE, agency theory), institutional theory focuses on the effects of 
institutional environments on firm behaviors. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that 
the three pillars of institutions—normative structures, cognitive structures, and regulative 
structures—shape and constrain managers’ choices of organizational forms. In other 
words, managers are constrained by the institutional environment to conform to the 
standard norms, because conformance provides legitimacy benefits that have beneficial 
effects on firm performance. From this perspective, research has examined the extent to 
which alliance formations are influenced by institutional factors. For example, Baum and 
Oliver (1991) found that on a sample of 1,028 Canadian childcare services, the childcare 
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 services that formed partnerships with well-established community institutions had 
higher survival rates. 
 
Strategic choice 
This perspective grew out of Michael Porter’s (1980; 1985) microeconomic 
industrial organization (I/O) arguments that the industry structures affect firm behaviors 
that result in the variances of firm performance (i.e., SCP). Drawing on these arguments, 
alliance research has studied whether alliance formations are determined by industry 
variables (such as interfirm competition). For example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1996) reported that the number of competitors in an industry is positively associated 
with alliance formation rate because of the needs to deal with the squeezed resources, 
stressed profits, and threatened survival. Silverman and Baum (2002) found that in 
Canadian biotechnology industry, firms form alliances to foreclose their alliance 
opportunities. In global airline industry, Gimeno (2004) found that a focal firm’s alliance 
formation was influenced by its rivals’ alliance formation patterns. 
In sum, this section of alliance formation review intends to investigate what 
factors drive firms to participate in alliances. This review suggests that expecting 
potential alliance benefits, firms participate in alliances under various circumstances. The 
potential alliance benefits as indicated by these dominant alliance theories include cost 
minimization from TCE theory, resource leverage and profit maximization from resource 
based view, interfirm power enhancement from resource dependence perspective, 
organizational legitimacy from institutional theory, interfirm learning from learning 
perspective, strategic positioning benefits from strategic choice perspective. However, 
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agency theory suggests that managers may choose to participate in alliances to minimize 
their own employment risks and/or optimize their own compensation benefits rather than 
the benefits to their shareholders.  
Alliance performance  
 
The purpose of this section is to investigate the extent to which the alliance effects 
on customers have been examined in alliance research. Several approaches have been 
used to measure the effects of alliance participation. Both subjective measures (e.g., 
partner satisfaction) and objective measures (e.g., financial performance, alliance survival) 
are used in assessing alliance performance (Geringer & Herbert,1991). In general, there 
are three broad categories of alliance performance measures: (1) financial performance 
measures, (2) alliance relationship measures, and (3) strategic performance measures. 
Next, I review the effects of alliance participation assessed by these different measures.   
 Table 1: Selected Research on Alliance Formation 
Authors Major Theory 
Major Findings 
Ahuja (2000) Resource based 
view 
A firm’s technical, commercial, social capital and the number of important inventions 
affect its the number of alliances formations. 
Chung, Singh, and 
Lee (2000) 
Resource based 
view 
Firms with complementary resources and similar status are more likely to form alliances. 
Colombo (2003) Transaction cost 
and learning theory 
When partners are technologically diverse, firms tend to use equity alliances to guard 
against partners’ opportunism. 
Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 
(1996) 
Resource based 
view 
Alliance formation is more likely in emergent-stage markets than growth-stage markets 
and in markets with highly innovative strategies. The rate of alliance formation is affected 
by the TMT’s size and previous industry exposure, and the level of previous positions held 
by TMT members. 
Gimeno (2004) Strategic behavior A focal firm’s alliance formation is influenced by its rivals’ alliance formation decisions. 
 
Glaister and 
Buckley (1998) 
Transaction cost 
and resource 
dependence 
Alliance formations are determined by partner size, geographical location of the alliance 
and the industry of the alliance. 
Gulati (1995) Transaction cost  Alliances are more likely to be equity based if they have a shared R & D component and 
if they are between firms from different nations. The greater the number of previous 
alliance, and particularly equity alliances, between the partners, the less likely the alliance 
is to be equity based.  
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Authors Major Theory Major Findings 
Gulati and 
Gargigulo (1999) 
 
Resource 
dependence theory 
As the level of resource interdependence between firms grows, the possibility of 
alliance formation increases. 
Hitt, Dacin, 
Levitas, Arregle, 
and Borza 
(2000) 
Resource based view When forming alliances, managers from emerging market emphasize partners’ 
financial assets, technological capabilities, intangible assets and willingness to share 
expertise than managers from developed market.  
Oxley and 
Sampson (2004) 
 
Transaction cost When forming alliance with a competitor, rather than abandoning potential gains 
from cooperation altogether in these circumstances, partners choose to limit the scope 
of alliance activities. 
Poppo and 
Zenger (1998)  
 
Transaction cost and 
learning 
Integration of transaction cost and learning variables offer higher predictive power of 
alliance formation. 
Reuer and 
Ragozzino 
(2006) 
Agency theory When internal officers and directors own lower level of the focal firm’s equity, its 
alliance portfolio tends to be more extensive. 
Shenkar and Li 
(1999) 
Learning theory When seeking foreign partners, local firms are likely to seek transfer of tacit or 
embedded knowledge via equity joint ventures than via contractual ventures.  
 
Villalonga and 
McGahan (2005) 
Transaction cost, 
learning, resource 
based view, and 
agency theory 
A firm with rich technological resources is not more inclined to pursue acquisitions 
over alliances. The marketing resources of both the focal and target firms are either 
irrelevant for boundary choices or favor the choice of divestitures over alliances. 
 
  
 Financial performance measures 
 
Does alliance participation affect the financial performance of firms? Financial 
ratios have been used to examine whether alliance participation creates superior 
economic value to the participating firms. Some commonly used financial ratios include 
sales revenue (Luo, 2002), return on investment (Luo), market valuation at IPO 
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999), market share (Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchell, 2004), return 
on sales, return on assets, and return on capital (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005). 
The empirical findings suggest that alliance participation has significant impacts 
on the firms’ financial performance. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) found that 
when allying with producers and suppliers, small- and medium-sized firms increased 
their return on assets and market share. Gulati and Higgins (2003) investigated how the 
different types of alliances of new firms affect initial public offering (IPO). They found 
that ties to the prominent venture capital firms were particularly positively associated 
with IPO success. Goerzen and Beamish (2005) found that as alliance networks became 
diverse, the focal firms’ return on sales, return on assets, and return on capital decreased. 
Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell (2004) examined how allying with rivals affects the 
market share of the partner firms. They found that the market share of the rival partners 
changes more than that of non-rival partners. 
There are two major limitations of using financial ratios to measure alliance 
performance. First, firms may enter into alliances for other reasons than financial 
performances such as legitimacy and interfirm learning. For example, some firms may 
form an alliance to learn the technological knowhow from partners. Arino (2003) argued 
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 that financial performance measures are relevant only when the alliance partners set 
explicit financial goals. Second, not all released accounting ratios are accurate or 
reflective of the actual financial effects of alliances because the differences in accounting 
standards and procedures in different countries confound the findings.  
 
Alliance relationship measures 
 
Despite the explosive growth of alliances, it is documented that over 50% of 
alliances failed (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). This high failure rate of alliances suggests 
that healthy and stable alliance relationships are difficult to maintain. This approach 
focuses on how to develop healthy and stable interfirm relationships. These studies 
examine alliance duration, termination, survival and renegotiation, mutual commitment, 
and partner satisfaction (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Saxton, 1997). 
For example, Poppo and Zenger (1998) measured the extent to which the focal firm is 
satisfied with the overall cost of the service, the quality of the output or service provided 
by its partners. Parkhe (1993) studied the relationship between alliance structure and 
alliance dissolution. 
This approach has several limitations. The primary limitation of this approach is 
that it does not reflect the performance asymmetry among the partners (Gulati, 1998). In 
other words, a successful alliance does not benefit every partner equally, whereas a 
terminated alliance does not mean all partners suffer. For example, Ross, Anderson and 
Weitz (1997) found that on a sample of 255 insurance agent relationships, the partners 
that committed fewer resources to the partnerships perceived higher alliance benefits than 
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 those that contributed more. Also, an alliance may be terminated because one partner 
successfully acquired the knowledge it lacked before it entered into the relationship. Thus, 
alliance termination does not always suggest unsuccessful results to the participating 
firms. Second, ongoing alliances do not necessarily mean successful alliance 
relationships. Gulati (1998) notes that problematic alliances continue rather than are 
terminated because of organizational inertia and high exit costs. 
 
Strategic performance measures 
 
Strategic performance measures examine the extent to which partners gain 
strategic benefits that may lead to competitive advantages. Strategic performance 
measures include market entry, learning effects, and goal fulfillments, rate of patenting 
(Shan,Walker & Kogut, 1994), product innovation (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Kelley & Rice, 
2002), speed to initial public offering (IPO) (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999), and 
customer orientation (Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003). For example, Rothaermel and 
Deeds (2006) studied the relationship between number of alliances and firm innovation. 
They found that the relationship is inverted U-shaped. Kotabe, Martin, and Domoto 
(2003) examined whether technical exchange and technology transfer affect supplier’s 
improvements in product design, process design, and lead time in automotive 
manufacturing industry. They found that U.S. manufacturers improve their suppliers’ 
product quality through exchange of technical information. 
In contrast to the above-mentioned supply-side strategic performance measures 
that exclusively focused on the benefits to the participating firms, marketing and services 
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literature suggest that firms can achieve sustainable competitive advantages only when 
their services and products are valued by customers (Srivastava, Fahey & Christensen, 
2001). With the exception of Rindfleish and Moorman (2003) and Bourdeau, Cronin,and 
Voorhees (2007), few published studies have examined the alliance effects on customers.  
This lack of attention to customers and services is not surprising, because in the 
management literature, the role of customers is missing. Ford and Bowen (2008) counted 
the mentions of “customer,” “consumer,” or “services” in the abstracts of nine premier 
management journals, which include Academy of Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Applied Psychology, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, Strategic Management Journal, 
Journal of Management, Organization Science, and Personal Psychology. They found 
only 139 mentions of the keywords in these journals between the inceptions of each 
journal and the end of 2006.  
 
 Table 2: Selected Research on Alliance Performance 
 
Authors Performance 
Measure 
Nature of the 
Performance Measure
Findings 
Afuah (2000)  Relationship with 
alliance partners 
Alliance relationship 
measures 
 
Technology obsolesce of supplier firms affects alliance 
outcomes and performance of buyer firms. 
Anand and Khanna 
(2000)  
Learning from 
alliance partners 
Strategic performance 
measure 
The type of alliance affects learning from a firm’s alliances. 
Learning effects are stronger for JVs than for licensing 
contracts and for R & D JVs than other types of JVs.  
 
 Almeida, Song and 
Grant (2002) 
Patent citations Strategic performance 
measure 
Multinational firms perform better than alliances in terms of 
patent citations because of their superior capability in 
managing knowledge. 
 
Arino and de la Torre 
(1998)  
Alliance failure Alliance relationship 
measures 
 
Trust and goodwill are needed to avoid alliance failure when 
renegotiation of major changes takes place.  
Barkema, Shenkar, 
Vermeulen, and Bell 
(1997) 
Alliance longevity  Alliance relationship 
measures 
 
The longevity of an IJV is negatively related to the cultural 
distance of the venture partners. The longevity of and IJV is 
also affected by the previous venturing experience the 
partner firms. 
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Authors Performance 
Measure 
Nature of the 
Performance Measure 
Findings 
Dussauge, Garrette, 
and Mitchell (2004) 
Market share Financial performance 
measures 
 
The market share of the rival partners changed more than that 
of non-rival partners. 
Goerzen and 
Beamish (2005) 
Return on sales, 
return on assets 
and return on 
capital 
Financial performance 
measures 
 
As alliance networks became diverse, the focal firms’ return 
on sales, return on assets and return on capital decreased. 
Gulati and Higgins 
(2003) 
IPO Financial performance 
measures 
 
Forming alliances with the prominent venture capital firms 
particularly contributed to IPO success. 
Stuart (2000) Innovation and 
sales growth 
Strategic performance 
measure, and 
Financial performance 
measure 
Firms that ally with large and innovative partners perform 
better than firms that lack such partners. In addition, such 
benefits are more salient for the small and young firms than 
for old and large firms. 
. 
 Alliance management 
 
Alliances are difficult to manage because of the various risks inherent in the 
interfirm relationships. Barringer and Harrison (2000) provided a list of the various 
alliance risks, which include loss of technological knowhow, management complexity, 
interfirm cultural clash, and partial loss of decision autonomy. Das and Teng (2001) 
categorized the various alliance risks into two major types of alliance risks. The first risk 
is relational risk that refers to the extent to which partners are willing to cooperate. Due to 
bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty, managers can never draft complete 
contracts that anticipate all the possible problematic scenarios in the process of 
cooperation. This contractual incompleteness gives rise to a variety of opportunistic 
behaviors that may lead an opportunistic partner to focus on its own private benefits 
rather than the common benefits to all participating firms. The relational risk 
management focuses on curbing opportunistic behaviors.  
Scholars have extensively examined the effects of interfirm trust and contractual 
mechanism on opportunistic behaviors. Trust is defined as “a psychological state 
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intention or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). 
Many scholars have suggested that trust is an indispensible element for successful 
interfirm relationships (Ireland et al., 2002). Since trust is defined as the willingness to be 
vulnerable to others’ behaviors, selecting trustworthy partners, effective communications, 
and interfirm adaptation are necessary to generate trust (Das & Teng, 1998). 
Trust is a necessary but insufficient condition for alliance success because blind 
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 trust does not benefit alliances. TCE argues that as the potential transaction costs increase 
(such as uncertainty and asset specificity), the more comprehensive and specific the 
contractual terms should be to guard against opportunistic behaviors. On the other hand, 
formal contracts may be a signal for distrust and even cause opportunistic behaviors. Luo 
(2002) found a positive relationship between cooperation and performance when 
contractual terms are highly specific and flexible. Poppo and Zenger (1998) found that 
firms tend to craft more complex and customized contracts as asset specificity increases 
and evaluating difficulty increases. They also found that trust and complex contracts are 
complements rather than substitutes in influencing satisfaction with alliance performance. 
They suggest that managers tend to employ greater level of relational norms as their 
contracts become more complex and customized, and use complex contracts as they 
develop greater levels of relational governance.  
In brief, to reduce the relational risks that stem from partners’ opportunistic 
behaviors, the literature suggests that interfirm trust and contractual governance are 
effective and complementary mechanisms. This underscores the importance of careful 
partner selection, crafting comprehensive, flexible, and customized contracts before 
alliance formation, and effective interfirm communication and adaptation after alliance 
formation. However, given the effectiveness of these approaches to avoid opportunism, it 
requires much of the managers’ time and effort to apply these approaches to minimize 
relational risks. 
The second risk is performance risk, which refers to “the probability and 
consequences that a firm’s strategic objectives are not achieved, despite full cooperation” 
(Das & Teng, 2001, p. 8). Alliance management complexity grows as the alliance task 
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 scope, alliance task depth or the partner diversity increases (White & Lui, 2005). Alliance 
task scope refers to the area of the alliance task interface between the partners, and it 
increases as the range of joint tasks covers broader geographic, hierarchical, market, or 
technological scope of the joint task increases. Alliance task depth refer to “the intensity 
of interaction between the partners and could be measured, for example, by the 
man-hours that each devote to a common task” (White & Lui, 2005, p. 916). As the 
alliance task scope or alliance task depth increases, the coordination needs require greater 
amount of managerial time and effort to coordinate the alliance tasks. Partner diversity 
refers to the extent to which the partners’ profiles differ. Even though resource and 
capability complementarities are motivators to participate in alliances, the partner 
diversity may also be related to coordination difficulties, because differences in national 
culture, organizational culture and operating routines make an alliance difficult to 
manage.  
The four attributes of alliance portfolios under investigation in this dissertation, 
which are alliance portfolio size, multilateral alliances, alliance partner country diversity, 
and alliance types, illustrate the differences in alliance management complexity. First, 
since alliance portfolio size is the number of alliances an airline simultaneously manages, 
as alliance portfolio size increases, so does either the alliance task scope and/or depth.  
Second, multilateral alliances differ from bilateral alliances in both alliance task 
scope and alliance task depth. A multilateral alliance involves at least two partners. 
Participating in multilateral alliances allows firms to access broader market scope. 
However, multilateral alliances require greater degree of interfirm coordination and 
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 mutual adjustments to accommodate the needs of multiple partners than do bilateral 
alliances. 
Third, with respect to the partner diversity, I focus on the alliance partner country 
diversity. An alliance involving an international partner may be particularly complex to 
coordinate because of the broad geographical scope, differences in the national culture, 
operating procedures, managerial characteristics and so forth may require greater mutual 
adjustments to achieve the alliance objectives. 
Fourth, alliance types differ in both scope and/or depth. Airline alliances are 
unique and different from the alliances in high-tech industries. Based on the alliance task 
scope and depth, airline alliances are classified into backward competitor-dominated 
alliances, forward alliances, and channel-dominated alliances. In channel-dominated 
airline alliances that are defined as the alliances with partners from other industries, the 
alliance scope and depth of interaction and related coordination costs are very low. For 
example, when an airline forms an alliance with a hotel or a travel agent, the scope or 
depth of interfirm interaction is low. Competitor-dominated airline alliances, defined as 
alliances between airlines, are further classified into backward competitor-dominated 
alliances and forward competitor-dominated alliances depending on the alliance task 
scope and alliance task depth. Backward competitor-dominated alliances focus on the 
input supply of the airlines (e.g., joint resource purchase) and forward competitor- 
dominated alliances involve direct interactions with customers (e.g., code sharing, joint 
baggage handlings). For instance, a code sharing alliance, which directly interacts with 
customers, involves more intense interfirm coordination effort and more employees of 
partner airlines than does a channel-dominated alliance (e.g., an alliance with hotels, car 
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 rental companies) or a backward competitor-dominated alliance (e.g., an alliance between 
airlines to jointly purchase fuel). 
 
Alliance experience 
 
Do firms differ from one another in their capabilities of managing these alliance 
risks to derive the anticipated benefits? Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) found that the 
alliance management capability of firms is systematically and heterogeneously distributed 
across firms. Most of the work on alliance management capability focuses on alliance 
experiences as a key source of alliance management capability. Drawing primarily from 
organizational learning and dynamic capability arguments, this line of research suggests 
that alliance management capability is a path-dependent capability accumulated from a 
firm’s previous alliance experience (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Alliance experience 
may help a firm build trust with repeat partners become more informed about the 
operational models of the alliances and set up routines to solve conflicts. Research has 
studied the alliance experience effects on alliance or firm performance, but not customer 
service quality. For example, Anand and Khanna (2000) investigated whether a firm’s 
experience in managing alliances is related to the firm’s ability to create value through 
alliances. 
In studying the moderating effects of alliance experience on the relationship 
between alliance portfolio attributes and customer service quality, I focus on the general 
alliance experience that refers to a firm’s cumulative experience with alliances 
(Rothaermal & Deeds, 2006). Zollo, Reuer and Singh (2002) found that relation-specific 
alliance experience has positive effects on alliance performance because it helps partners 
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routinize the alliance coordination. However, Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) found that 
the general alliance experience of the biotechnology partners is positively related to 
alliance project performance, and relation-specific experience has a negative effect on 
alliance project performance. Consequently, this dissertation focuses on general alliance 
experience rather than relation-specific experience.  
  
 Table 3: Selected Research on Alliance Management Capability 
 
Author(s) Research Question Findings 
Anand and Khanna (2000) Do firms learn to manage alliances as their 
alliance experience accumulates?  
Significant learning effects in managing joint 
ventures are found, but no such evidence for 
licensing contracts. 
 
Deeds and Hill (1996)  Can a firm effectively manage a large 
number of alliances?  
When the number of alliances exceeds managers’ 
capability in managing alliances, benefits a firm 
can derive from an alliance decreases. 
 
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) Does alliance experience increase alliance 
performance? What are the effects of 
general alliance experience and 
relation-specific experience affect alliance 
performance? 
The general alliance experience of the 
biotechnology partners is, but not of the 
pharmaceutical firms, positively affected joint 
project performance. Yet, partner-specific 
experience has a negative, marginally significant 
effect on joint project performance. 
 
Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) What factors influence firms’ ability to 
build alliance capability and enjoy greater 
alliance success? 
Firms with a dedicated alliance function derive 
greater alliance benefits than those without. 
 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) What factors affect a high-tech firm’s 
alliance management capability?  
Alliance type and alliance experience 
significantly affect alliance management 
capability. 
 
Zollo, Reuer and Singh (2002) Does relation-specific alliance experience 
benefit alliance performance?  
Relation-specific alliance experience has positive 
effects on alliance performance because it helps 
partners routinize the alliance coordination. 
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 A Brief Review of Service Quality 
 
In organizational research, the role of customers is largely missing (Ford & 
Bowen, 2008). Incorporating the role of customers into organizational research is 
important, as Brief (2002) noted that “a consumer orientation to the study of 
management undoubtedly will lead scholars into uncharted territories and eventually 
will expand the field's boundaries” (p. 187). Among the various research topics 
related to customers, this dissertation focuses on service quality, which is “the single 
most researched area” in services marketing research (Brown, Fisk, & Bitner, 1994, p. 
33). In the following section, I will review the pertinent literature to illustrate the 
importance of service quality and identify the knowledge gaps in the extant service 
quality that this dissertation intends to fill.  
The importance of service quality 
 
Service quality is one of the most important organizational outcomes in that 
provision of quality services leads to favorable customer behaviors and consequently 
enhances performance of firms (Heskett, Jone, & Loveman, 1994; Heskett, Sasser, & 
Schlesinger, 1997; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996). A large amount of 
research has studied whether customers exhibit favorable behaviors to the firms that 
provide quality services (e.g., Bell, Auh, & Smalley, 2005; Eisingerich & Bell, 2008; 
Olorunniwo & Hsu, 2006; Olorunniwo, Hsu, & Udo, 2006; Qin & Prybutok, 2008; 
Rafaeli, Ziklik, & Doucet, 2008; Wall & Berry, 2007).  
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 Empirical evidence indicates positive effects of service quality and favorable 
customer responses, which include repurchase intentions (Brady & Cronin 2001), 
positive word of mouth (Swanson & Davis, 2003), customer loyalty (Tam, 2004), 
customer satisfaction (Brady, Cronin & Brand, 2002), customer trust (Eisingerich & 
Bell, 2008), and price insensitivity (de Ruyter, 1998). For example, Brady and Cronin 
(2001) found when customers perceive the service quality is good, they tend to 
repurchase more. Swanson and Davis (2003) found a positive relationship between 
service quality and favorable word of mouth. Tam (2004) found that service quality is 
positively related to repurchase intention, word of mouth, and customer loyalty. Brady 
et al. (2002) found positive relationships between service quality and customer 
satisfaction, repurchase intention, and word of mouth. Eisingerich and Bell (2008) 
found that customers exhibit higher trust to firms that provide quality services than 
those that do not. A positive relationship between perceived service quality and price 
insensitivity was found by de Ruyter (1998). He observed that despite higher prices, 
customers still remain loyal to the firms providing quality services. 
The positive relationships between service quality and customer responses have 
received empirical support in different regions and countries (Çalik & Balta, 2006; 
Daskalopoulou & Petrou, 2005; Liang & Wang, 2006; Lymperopoulos, Chaniotakis, 
& Soureli, 2006; Wong & Sohal, 2003). For example, on a sample of Chinese retail 
stores, Wong and Sohal (2003) found that service quality is positively associated with 
customer loyalty. Using questionnaires on a sample of 1,092 bank customers in 
Athens, Lymperopoulos et al. (2006) found that bank service quality is the most 
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 important factor that influences customers’ decision in selecting their mortgage loan 
providers. 
 As a result of favorable customer responses to their quality services, firms 
can enhance brand equity (Bamert & Wehrli, 2005), efficiency, recruiting and 
retention of talented employees (Luo & Homburg, 2007), and financial performance 
(Aaker & Jacobson, 1994; Aksoy, Cooil, Groening, Keiningham, & Yalçın, 2008; 
Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; Rust, 
Moorman, & Dickson, 2002). Brand equity literature indicates that “a firm’s good 
brand image and strong public reputation represent another critical intangible asset 
that has financial content and long-term value” (Luo, 2007, p. 77). Bamert and Wehrli 
(2005) found that service quality is an important part of brand equity in services 
markets. Efficiency refers to “the conversion ratio of organizational resource inputs to 
desirable goal outcomes” (Luo & Homburg, 2007, p. 133). Luo and Homburg (2007) 
found that when customers are satisfied with its service, the firm enhances its 
advertising and promotion efficiency, because satisfied customers tend to spread 
positive word of mouth and thus save its marketing investments. Further, they noted 
that customer service has a positive influence on a firm’s ability in hiring and 
retaining talented employees, because providing quality services implies a firm’s 
financial strengths and attractiveness.    
A large amount of empirical evidence suggests the positive relationship 
between service quality and financial performance, which is usually measured with 
financial ratios such as stock return (Aaker & Jacobson, 1994; Aksoy et al., 2008; 
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 Anderson et al., 2004) , return on investment (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984), and 
return on assets (Rust et al., 2002). For example, Aaker and Jacobson (1994) found a 
positive association between stock return and service quality. Interestingly, they noted 
that quality services are not only valued by the shareholders who are regular 
customers of the firm, but also those who are not, because a firm’s commitment to 
quality is viewed as a signal of its long-term promising performance. Aksoy et al. 
(2008) showed that investors tend to buy stocks of the firms that provide quality 
services. They noted that  
[A] $100 investment in a portfolio of firms with high customer satisfaction and an 
increase in customer satisfaction more than triples to $312. To put our results in 
perspective, the same $100 investment in the S&P 500 grows only to $205. The 
performance of a portfolio of firms with low customer satisfaction and a decrease 
in customer satisfaction is significantly weaker, with the $100 investment actually 
decreasing to $98. (p. 108)  
Relatedly, Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl (2004, p. 181) observed that “for a 
BusinessWeek 1000 firm with average assets of approximately $10 billion, a 1% 
improvement in satisfaction implies an increase in the firm’s value of approximately 
$275 million.” Anderson and Zeithaml (1984) found that service quality is positively 
related to return on investment in mature industries. Rust, Moorman, and Dickson 
(2002) found that quality improvements are positively related to firms’ return on 
assets. 
As opposed to the favorable customer responses to the firms that provide 
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 quality services, even loyal customers become the worst enemies and retaliate against 
the firms that provide poor services (Grégoire & Fisher, 2008). In recent years, 
customers have become more powerful with the emergence of internet social 
networking websites such as youtube.com and myspace.com. Customers can make 
their negative voices widely heard if they feel they have experienced poor service 
quality. For example, after Apple refused to repair his personal computer under 
warranty, Mr. Michael Whitford allegedly uploaded a video to youtube.com in which 
he smashed his Apple computer into pieces with a hammer. Reportedly, more than 
340,000 individuals viewed his smashing action video (McGregor, 2008). Also, 
customers may voice their complaints directly to the top managers. In October 2007, 
after his US Airways flight waited on the runway for three hours, Mr. Ron Dee started 
sending emails to US Airways’ CEO and COO from his BlackBerry cell phone every 
15 minutes or so, while he was stuck on the runway. Such negative behaviors from 
customers are detrimental to a firms’ reputation and operations (McGregor, 2008).  
Empirical evidence suggests poor service leads to negative customer behaviors 
and decreased firm performance especially in the US airline industry. For example, 
Forbes (2008) found a negative relationship between service quality and customer 
complaints in the airline industry. Also, Zins (2001) found that poor service quality is 
associated with low airline image, customer satisfaction and customer loyalty. 
Wangenheim and Bayon (2007) found that when they experience an airline’s 
overbooking problems, customers tend to reduce their future repurchases with that 
airline. Luo (2007) found a negative relationship between customer complaints and 
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 stock returns. He observed that  
[F]or Southwest Airlines, which has a $12 billion market value, a 1% increase in 
DOT complaints could lead to a $262 million loss in market capitalization, all 
else being equal. Furthermore, for American Airlines, which has a $6.5 billion 
market value, a 1% decrease in DOT complaints could help the airline gain $138 
million in market capitalization, a substantial increase in shareholder wealth. 
(Luo, 2007, p. 82) 
Knowledge gaps in the current customer service quality literature 
 
Given the importance of service quality, two major limitations exist in the 
current service quality literature that this dissertation intends to address. First, most of 
the service quality research has relied on perceptual measures of service quality. This 
approach is cross-sectional in nature and provides only limited information on causal 
inference between independent and dependent variables. Second, the current research 
on antecedents to service quality has primarily focused on the effects of customer 
characteristics, employee management, and firm characteristics, while only limited 
research has investigated the effects of alliances on service quality. Next, I will 
review the literature to discuss the need to address these two limitations.  
Data and measurements 
 
The most widely accepted definition of service quality is provided by 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry in 1988. Believing quality is in the eyes of the 
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 customers, they defined quality as “the consumer's judgment about an entity's overall 
excellence or superiority…[service quality] results from a comparison of expectations 
with perceptions of performance” (Parasuraman, Zeithaml & Berry, 1988, p. 15) . 
This definition suggests that service quality is a function of the gap between 
customers’ postpurchase evaluation of their service experience and their prepurchase 
expectations. When the postpurchase evaluation exceeds the prepurchase expectation, 
the service quality is deemed as positive. This approach is also known as the 
disconfirmation approach (Spreng & Mackoy, 1996) because it contrasts the 
customer’s prepurchase expectation and postpurchase evaluation.  
Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry (1985) conceptualized service quality as a 
function of five gaps, i.e., consumer expectation and management perception gap (gap 
1), management perception-service quality specification gap (gap 2), service quality 
specifications-service delivery gap (gap 3), service delivery–external  
communications gap (gap 4), and expected service-perceived service gap (gap 5). To 
measure service quality, Parasuraman et al. (1988) generated 22 survey items, which 
were factor-analyzed into five dimensions: tangibles (i.e., physical environment, 
facilities, equipment, and personal appearance), reliability (i.e., ability to perform the 
promised service reliably), responsiveness (i.e., willingness to help customers and 
provide prompt service), assurance (i.e., knowledge and courtesy of employees and 
their ability to convey trust and confidence), and empathy (i.e., caring, individualized 
attention provided to customers). Parasuraman et al.’s measurement of service quality 
is widely known as SERVQUAL. Parasuraman et al. (1988) claimed that SERVQUAL 
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 is a concise multiple-item scale with good reliability and validity that retailers can use 
to better understand the service expectations and perceptions of consumers and, as a 
result, improve service. The instrument has been designed to be applicable across a 
broad spectrum of services (p. 31). In other words, SERVQUAL has two major 
strengths. First, as opposed to objective measures, SERVQUAL relies on customers’ 
perceptions. Customers can evaluate the quality of a service more easily based on 
their own expectations than on predetermined objective specifications. Second, since 
it uses perceptual measures that do not involve specific technical specifications, 
SERVQUAL can be applied across different industries.  
Despite its strengths and popularity in services marketing research, recently 
scholars have questioned the validity of the perceptual, survey based SERVQUAL 
items regarding its inclusion of prepurchase expectations, scale dimensionality, and 
item validity (Carrillat, Jaramillo, & Mulki, 2007; Coulthard, 2004; Ladhari, 2008). 
Given these limitations of SERVQUAL, scholars have called for industry- specific 
measures of service quality and studies using longitudinal data. Ladhari (2008) 
suggests that service quality measures should be industry specific, because the 
SERVQUAL items are inadequate to measure service quality in diverse settings.  
Also, given the perceptual nature of SERVQUAL, the vast majority of service 
quality studies have relied on cross-sectional survey-based data, but little research has 
used objective, longitudinal archival data to study service quality. In a review of 
service quality literature, Zeithaml (2000) called for longitudinal studies and said that 
“virtually all of the research looking at the associations have been cross-sectional 
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 studies spanning companies and industries… Longitudinal approaches that involve 
satisfaction and financial performance data in individual firms are a needed 
approach…” (p. 73).   
Employing longitudinal archival data allows researchers to test temporal 
precedence, which is critical to detect causality (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Although 
cross-sectional survey data can test covariations between the independent and 
dependent variables, significant covariations do not mean that independent variables 
precede dependent variables. In order to draw causal conclusions between antecedents 
and consequences, longitudinal data provide a means to create a time lag between 
independent variables and dependent variables. Wooldridge (2006) noted that   
…observing the same units over time leads to several advantages over 
cross-sectional data or even pooled cross-sectional data… the use of more than 
one observation can facilitate causal inference in situations where inferring 
causality would be very difficult if only a single cross section were available. A 
second advantage of panel data is that it often allows us to study the importance 
of lags in behavior or the result of decision making. This information can be 
significant since many economic policies can be expected to have an impact only 
after some time has passed. (p. 12) 
Antecedents of service quality 
 
In service quality research, various antecedents of service quality have been 
extensively studied with different foci on customer characteristics, employee 
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 management, and firm characteristics, yet only limited research has studied alliance 
effects. First, a group of scholars have focused on the effects of customer 
characteristics on their perceptions of service quality. The customer characteristics 
include customers’ national culture (Laroche, Ueltschy, Abe, Cleveland, & 
Yannopoulos, 2004; Tsoukatos & Rand, 2007), geography (Mittal, Kamakura, & 
Govind, 2004), customers’ mood, emotions (White, 2006), age, gender and income 
(Anderson, Pearo & Widener, 2008), and customers’ previous service experiences 
(Rust et al., 1999). For example, Anderson et al. (2008) found that customers’ age is 
positively related to customer satisfaction but their income is negatively related to 
customer satisfaction.  
Another group of scholars have focused on how to manage employees to produce 
quality services. This stream of research has examined the various antecedents to 
service quality that include employee training (Hui, Lam, & Schaubroeck, 2001; Yoo 
& Park, 2007), service scripts (Shoemaker, 1996), attitude (Brady & Cronin 2001; 
Lee, Lee, & Yoo, 2000), behavior (Babbar & Koufteros, 2008; Wall & Berry, 2007), 
expertise (Doucet, 2004), employee commitment (Elmadag, Ellinger, & Franke, 2008), 
and personality (Hui, Cheng, & Gan, 2003; Lin, Chiu, & Hsieh, 2001). For example, 
Yoo and Park (2007) found that on a sample of 129 hotels when employees have 
received service quality training and share an understanding of their visions, service 
standards, and service performance results, firms expect higher service quality.  
Also, some scholars have focused on the effects of firm characteristics, such as 
price policies (Teas & Agarwal, 2000), service environment (Baker, Grewal, & 
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 Parasuraman, 1994), service climate (Dabholkar & Overby, 2005; Schneider. Ehrhart, 
Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly, 2005), customer/market orientation (Chang & Chen, 
1998; Voon, 2006), organizational capabilities (Roth & Jackson, 1995), private 
branding (Herstein & Gamliel, 2006), and leadership styles (Clark, Hartline, & Jones, 
2008). For example, Chang and Chen (1998) found market orientation, defined as the 
extent to which firms focus on customer needs and preferences, is positively related to 
service quality.  
Yet, with the recent explosive growth of alliances, only a few studies have 
examined the effects of alliances on customer services. Votolato and Unnava (2006) 
studied the spillover effects of partners’ negative information on the performance of 
branding alliances. They found that partners’ moral failures are more detrimental to 
the branding alliance than the partner’s competence failures. Rao, Lu and Ruekert 
(1999) investigated whether forming alliances signals information about the focal 
firm’s quality to customers. They found that when a product has an important 
unobservable attribute, consumers perceive its quality to be high when the focal firms’ 
partner can be sanctioned easily by customers in case of quality failures. Simonin and 
Ruth (1998) found that the performance of the branding alliances affects customers’ 
subsequent evaluation of the qualities of each partner. Despite the limited research at 
the alliance level, the empirical evidence suggests that alliances have significant 
effects on service quality. 
Especially in the airline industry, studies have shown that alliances have 
substantial spillover effects on the focal airline’s service quality. Bourdeau, Cronin 
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 and Voorhees (2007) found that the service quality of Delta’s remote check-in service 
operated by its partner has significant impact of customers’ assessment of Delta’s own 
service quality. In a qualitative study, Weber and Sparks (2004) concluded that an 
airline’s service quality is negatively affected in case of its partners’ service failure. 
As a consequence, the focal airline may subsequently experience customer 
dissatisfaction, negative word of mouth and low customer loyalty. Tsantoulis and 
Palmer (2008) found that the service quality of airlines in alliances does not converge. 
Their explanation was that “airline co-brand alliances are created for a number of 
reasons other than promoting one shared brand with a consistent level of quality” (p. 
61).  
In sum, this service quality review suggests that service quality is a very 
important organizational outcome in that provision of quality services is beneficial to 
the firm’s customers and its financial performance. Yet, there are two major 
knowledge gaps in the current service quality research that have been identified in this 
literature review and this dissertation intends to fill. First, the vast majority of service 
quality research has relied on the perceptual, cross-sectional SERVQUAL surveys to 
study service quality. Scholars have called for use of longitudinal data (Zeithaml, 
2000) and industry-specific measures (Ladhari, 2008) to study service quality. The use 
of longitudinal archival data provides greater confidence in detecting causality by 
creating time lags between independent and dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2006). 
This dissertation uses industry-specific longitudinal archival data of US airline 
industry collected from the US DOT’s Air Travel Consumer Report to study service 
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 quality (see chapter 4 for details of data collection).  
Specifically, the four measures of airline service quality used in this dissertation 
include consumer complaint, involuntary denied boarding, on time arrival and 
mishandled baggage. These four measures have been used in other recent studies, 
both separately and collectively, to study airline service quality (e.g., Lapre & 
Tsikriktsis, 2006; Luo, 2007; Rhoades & Waguespack, 2000; Rhoades & Waguespack, 
2008; Tiernan, Rhoades, & Waguespack, 2008; Tsantoulis & Palmer, 2008; 
Waguespack, Rhoades, & Tiernan, 2007). Some scholars used some of these four 
measures to study airline service quality. For example, Lapre and Tsikriktsis (2006) 
used consumer complaint data to study the effects of airline learning in reducing 
customer dissatisfaction. Also using consumer complaint data, Luo (2007) studied the 
effects of customer complaints on airlines’ stock return. Waguespack, Rhoades and 
Tiernan (2007) used three of the measures (i.e., on time arrival, involuntary denied 
boarding and mishandled baggage) to compare the service quality between the US and 
the European airlines. Other scholars used all of the four measures. For example, 
Rhoades and Waguespack (2000, 2008) used all four measures to study the variances 
in airline service quality. Especially, Tiernana et al. (2008) and Tsantoulis and Palmer 
(2008) used these measures to study alliance effects on service quality. Apparently, 
these four measures are valid proxies for airline service quality, and thus are all 
included in this dissertation.  
Equally important is the knowledge gap pertaining to the relationship between 
alliances and service quality. To explore the antecedents of service quality, researchers 
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 have examined the various antecedents pertaining to customer characteristics, 
employee management, and firm characteristics. Unfortunately, only limited attention 
has been paid to alliance effects on service quality. Yet, several recent studies suggest 
that alliances are an important source to understand the variances in service quality of 
firms (e.g., Bourdeau, Cronin, & Voorhees, 2007; Weber & Spark, 2004; Tsantoulis & 
Palmer, 2008). This dissertation fills the knowledge gap pertaining to the alliance 
effects on service quality by introducing a set of alliance portfolio variables that are 
important and have not received empirical investigation.  
Airline Alliance Paradox 
 
“Paradox denotes contradictory yet interrelated 
elements—elements that seem logical in isolation but 
absurd and irrational when appearing simultaneously” 
(Lewis, 2000, p. 760). 
“Paradox, the dynamic tensions of juxtaposed 
opposites (Rosen, 1994, p. xvii)” (Lado, Boyd, Wright, & 
Kroll , 2006, p. 115).  
According to the definitions above, the most salient characteristic of a paradox 
is its contradictory nature. For example, the famous liar paradox—a person claims 
himself to always be a liar. This denotes a contradiction—is this statement itself a lie 
or not?  
Organizational paradoxes occur when rational actors make decisions or act to 
increase firm performance but end up with unintended, disappointing effects on firm 
performance. For example, Raynor (2007, p. 1) noted that  
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 …most strategies are built on specific beliefs about the future. Unfortunately, the 
future is deeply unpredictable. Worse, the requirements of breakthrough success 
demand implementing strategy in ways that make it impossible to adapt should 
the future not turn out as expected. The result is the Strategy Paradox: strategies 
with the greatest possibility of success also have the greatest possibility of failure. 
Resolving this paradox requires a new way of thinking about strategy and 
uncertainty. 
Studying paradoxes helps managers and scholars recognize the complex and 
often juxtaposed effects of firm behavior (Cameron & Quinn, 1988). “The use of 
paradox can promote divergent or ‘oppositional’ thinking, cultivate interest, and 
increase a theory’s generative potency…Companies may succeed or fail based on 
differences in their capability to manage paradox” (Lado et al., 2006, p. 115). Poole 
and Van de Ven (1989, p. 562) also noted that “use of paradox can deepen our 
understanding by enabling scholars to address logical contradiction (or conundrums) 
in a theory and to identify tensions and oppositions in order to develop more 
encompassing theories.” Furthermore, Poole and Van de Ven (1989) pointed out that 
most of the current theories are built on internally consistent theories of limited scope, 
but relatively little attention has been paid to the opposing views of organizational 
theories. They argued “internally consistent theories do not always lead to good 
theories…because organizational theories attempt to capture a multifaceted reality 
with a finite, internally consistent statement, they are essentially incomplete” (Poole 
& Van de Ven,1989, p. 562).  
Recently, there has been a growing interest in investigating paradoxes in 
management research. For example, Audia, Locke, and Smith (2000) investigated the 
paradoxical consequences of past firm success. They found that past success leads to 
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 greater strategic persistence after a radical environmental change, and such 
persistence hurt performance. Sterman, Repenning, and Kofman (1997) studied the 
contradictory effects of quality improvements on the financial performance of firms. 
They found that when adopting quality improvement programs like TQM, firms 
experience lower short-run financial performance, but have higher long-term financial 
performance.  
The paradox under investigation here is an alliance paradox in the U.S. airline 
industry, which occurs as airline managers make rational decisions to enhance firm 
performance by participating in a wide range of alliances, but firms experience 
erosion in customer service quality as a result of failure to manage increased alliance 
complexity. However, managing the alliances requires substantial amount of time and 
effort by the airline managers. Since the airline managers are already busy individuals, 
as the level of alliance complexity increases, they may fail to effectively manage 
alliances. In situations where market is not a viable option, many firms prefer 
alliances to hierarchical organization (i.e., internal development, or merger and 
acquisition), because alliances require less investment, provide more flexibility, and 
expedite market entry.  
In the context of U.S. airline industry, the fierce competition puts airlines’ 
survival often at stake. Since the U.S. airline deregulation in 1978, due to the partial 
loss of market protection of their markets, airlines have faced fierce market 
competition. Between 1979 and 1989, 14 airlines exited the U.S. airline industry 
(Williams, 2001), and 5 out of 11 U.S. major airlines (i.e., ATA airlines, Delta, 
Northwest, United Airlines, and US Airways) simultaneously filed for bankruptcy in 
2005. Airline managers constantly face pressures to contain costs and enhance 
revenues merely to secure organizational survival. However, there are regulatory 
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 constraints that make going it alone unpopular. For example, market expansion is 
severely constrained by regulations, limited availability of airport infrastructure, and 
high acquisition costs of aircrafts. Some regulations stipulate that an airline needs 
government approval to fly a desired route and that a majority of an airline’s equity be 
held by a domestic organization. The limited availability of infrastructure (e.g., 
available terminal space and slots) is another important barrier for an airline to access 
some markets on its own. Moreover, market expansion through merger and 
acquisition incurs considerably higher costs such as purchase of new aircrafts to 
accommodate the increased passenger volume. Alliance participation helps airlines 
circumvent the above-mentioned constraints. For instance, a code sharing alliance 
allows airlines to access the markets of their partners that have been already approved 
by the government and to use their partners’ airport infrastructure (Kleymann & 
Seristö, 2004). 
Participating in alliances has emerged as an appealing strategy to reduce costs 
and enhance revenues. In several aspects, alliance participation can help airlines 
enhance revenues. First, participating in alliances with other airlines facilitates market 
scope expansion of the airlines by avoiding the constraints of serving extended 
markets by itself. For example, code sharing agreements allow airlines to expand their 
market scope to reach their partners’ market. Also, airline alliances can increase their 
revenues with enhanced customer benefits. Such customer benefits include the 
frequent flyer programs with other airlines, hotels, car rental companies, theme parks, 
and “seamless” travel to a greater number of destinations without the hassle of 
checking baggage at connections.  
The central theme of the airline alliance paradox lies in the fact that since 
airlines are forced to reduce costs and enhance revenues merely to survive, alliance 
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 participation is a viable and attractive strategy. However, given these benefits, as the 
alliance task scope, alliance task depth and alliance partner diversity increase, airline 
managers’ capability of managing the alliance complexity may decrease. This may 
lead to inferior customer service quality that has profound long term impact on firm 
performance. Customer service quality is especially important in the U.S. airline 
industry. Luo (2007) found that one percent increase in customer complaints could 
lead Southwest Airlines to a $262 million loss in its stock returns, and one percent 
decrease in customer complaints would provide American Airlines a substantial gain 
of $138 million from the stock market. Thus, alliance participation creates a potential 
paradox. 
Summary  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the extent to which the extant 
research has studied alliance effects on service quality and provide a theoretical 
foundation for the relationships presented in Figure 1 by reviewing the pertinent 
alliance research and service quality research. 
In the alliance section, I reviewed topics on alliance formation, alliance 
performance and alliance risks. The alliance formation research suggests that firms 
are motivated by various alliance benefits to form alliances, such as cost efficiency 
improvement, fast market entry and competitive positioning. The vast majority of 
alliance formation literature has been built on the supply-side arguments to investigate 
how alliance benefits, costs and risks affect alliance formation, alliance structuring, 
and alliance performance.  
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 The review of alliance performance suggests that the majority of performance 
measures focused on the alliance benefits or risks that occur to the participating firms, 
while little is known about how the customers are affected. Alliance research has 
examined the various consequences of alliances concerned with the financial 
performance (e.g., IPO, DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999), health and stability of alliance 
relationship (e.g., alliance survival, Dussauge et al., 2004), and strategic benefits (e.g., 
innovation, Deeds & Hill, 1996). Yet, the alliance research overlooked the alliance 
effects on customers. 
The review of alliance management focuses on the alliance management 
complexity issues, discusses how the independent variables in this dissertation vary in 
term of alliance complexity, and also discusses how the alliance experience may affect 
alliance performance.  
The review on service quality first noted the limitations of current 
measurement of service quality. Despite the compelling appeal of SERVQUAL, its 
perceptual nature has resulted in a lack of research using longitudinal archival data. 
However, recent marketing studies have began using objective, longitudinal data to 
measure key dimensions of service quality. For example, Lapre and Tsikriktsis (2006) 
and Luo (2007) used longitudinal customer complaint data as a proxy for customers’ 
perception of inferior service quality. Following this approach, this dissertation uses 
objective longitudinal data to measure the key components of quality services.  
The literature review on service quality antecedents suggests that various 
antecedents of customer service quality have been investigated at customer, employee, 
and firm level, along with a limited research at alliance level. However, no empirical 
research has tapped into alliance portfolio effects as determinants. The empirical 
results on service quality consequences underscore the urgency and importance of 
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 bridging the knowledge gap between alliance portfolio management and service 
quality because quality services are positively associated with both customers’ 
behavioral intentions and the firm’s financial performances. 
It is critical to understand how a firm can effectively organize its activities 
around a portfolio of alliances in which it is involved in. Gulati (1998) noted  
…as firms entered alliances with growing frequency, many prominent firms, such 
as General Electric, Corning, Motorola, IBM, and Hewlett Packard, have found 
themselves in hundreds of alliances. While issues concerning the management of 
individual alliances are still important and merit further consideration, new issues 
resulting from managing a portfolio of alliance have arisen. This opens up 
numerous questions about the cooperative capabilities of firms. (p. 294) 
The review of airline alliance paradox suggests that a paradox occurs when 
rational managers intend to enhance firm performance, but end up with a 
disappointing firm performance (Raynor, 2007). The review indicates the importance 
of investigating organizational paradoxes. Particularly in the U.S. airline industry, 
rational managers are pressured to cut costs and increase revenues. Participating in 
alliances is a very variable strategy to obtain these objectives. However, paradoxical 
effects may occur when the alliance management complexity exceeds alliance 
management capability of the managers.  
In conclusion, the extant supply-side perspectives of alliance literature have 
largely overlooked the alliance effects on the demand-side, i.e., the 
customers/consumers. Recently, management scholars noted that focusing on 
supply-side perspectives while overlooking the customers on the demand side is 
incomplete in assessing competitive asymmetries (DeSarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006), 
and identifying sources of sustainable competitive advantages (Adner & Zemsky 
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 2006). Srivastava, Fahey and Christensen (2001) suggested that creating and 
sustaining customer value that customers perceive through service experiences lead to 
inimitable competitive advantage. Given the importance of customers, the fact that 
little alliance research has paid attention to customers is an important and unfilled gap 
in the strategy research. Even in marketing where the consumer has been a central 
research focus, scholars have lamented that the empirical research examining the 
alliance effects on customers is “scant at best” (Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003). To fill 
this literature gap, this is the first empirical research to study the antecedents of 
service quality at alliance portfolio level.  
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 CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Chapter 2 reviewed research pertaining to alliances, service quality and airline 
alliance paradox. Built on the literature review, this chapter hypothesizes the 
relationships presented in Figure 1. In the following section, the direct effects of four 
alliance portfolio attributes on service quality are investigated: alliance portfolio size, 
multilateral alliances, alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type. Further, I 
hypothesize a focal firm’s alliance experience moderates the effects of alliance 
portfolio size and multilateral alliances on customer service quality. 
Hypotheses Development 
Alliance portfolio size  
 
Alliance portfolio size is the number of alliances a firm simultaneously 
manages. Since participating in a large number of alliances potentially enables firms 
to access valuable resources, technological expertise, and information, alliance 
portfolio size may enhance firm performance. Several studies reported positive 
relationships between the number of alliances and firm performance. Chang (2004) 
found that internet startups’ alliance portfolio size is positively related to their speed 
of IPO launch. Baum, Calabrese and Silverman (2000) found that in the Canadian 
biotechnology industry, young large alliance portfolio size of the young firms is 
associated with higher stock prices.  
However, if alliance participation is always associated with higher 
performance, why do firms not participate in as many alliances as possible? Deeds 
and Hill (1996) argued that the relationship between alliance portfolio size and firm 
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 performance is curvilinear, rather than linearly positive, because of diminishing 
returns from excessive alliance participation. Diminishing return refers to the 
declining alliance benefits to the focal firm as the alliance portfolio size grows beyond 
an optimal number of alliances. Deeds and his colleagues (Deeds & Hill, 1996; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006) reported an inverted U relationship between alliance 
portfolio size and product innovations in the biotechnology industry. In brief, the 
preponderance of empirical results suggests that the alliance portfolio size is 
positively related to firm performance, at least before it reaches some optimal point. 
In the context of this study, airlines have aggressively formed many alliances 
to reduce costs and enhance revenues. The various forms of alliance arrangements 
include code sharing, block seat sales, frequent flyer programs, joint maintenance, 
joint advertising and promotion, sharing of ground facilities, joint baggage handling, 
joint fuel purchase, joint computer reservation systems, as well as joint insurances and 
parts pooling (Rhoades & Lush, 1997; Goh & Uncles, 2003). These various alliances 
provide potential benefits to both the airlines and their customers. First, alliances can 
increase revenue, reduce operating costs through economies of scale, and improve 
market competitiveness. Agreements like code sharing facilitate market expansion. 
Airlines can take advantage of economies of scale to reduce costs by sharing airport 
facilities, joint advertising and promotion, and collective purchase of fuel and other 
parts (Oum & Park, 1997). For example, using data on four global strategic alliances, 
Iatrou and Alamdari (2005) found that airline alliances lead to an increase of 9.4% in 
customer volume, because airlines can serve a broader market. Park and Zhang (2000) 
reported that alliances increase airlines’ market share by 21% and decrease marginal 
costs by 46%. Second, alliances also provide benefits to customers. For instance, 
airline alliances allow customers to reach a greater number of destinations without the 
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 hassles of baggage checking at the connections. By traveling allied airlines, customers 
have more flight choices, enhanced frequent flyer benefits, and possibly lower fares. 
Park and Zhang found that partners in international airline alliances can reduce fares 
by 19%. 
What is the relationship between alliance portfolio size and service quality in 
the U.S. airline industry? Despite the aforementioned alliance benefits, I posit a 
negative relationship between alliances and service quality for several reasons. First, 
as the number of alliance grows, managers’ capability in preventing relational risks 
decreases. Managers are intendedly rational but only limitedly so. March and Simon 
(1958) argued that “the boundaries of rationality …have consisted primarily of the 
properties of human beings as organisms capable of evoking and executing relatively 
well defined programs but able to handle programs only of limited complexity” (p. 
171). Participating in a large alliance portfolio increases the managers’ difficulties in 
selecting partners, building trust, and crafting sufficiently complete contracts to guard 
against opportunistic behaviors.  
Also, increased complexity and uncertainty in operating procedures require 
multiple routines to coordinate alliance activities. Since alliance partners are mutually 
interdependent to achieve alliance objectives (Inkpen, 2001), mutual interdependence 
leads to shared control and management, which increase the complexity of alliance 
management. Because partners remain independent, there is uncertainty as to what 
one party expects the other party to do. To alleviate the alliance complexity and 
uncertainty, establishing stable interfirm routines and coordination enhances the 
effectiveness of collaboration (Zollo et al., 2002). Firms need to develop multiple sets 
of routines to develop, produce, and sell their services as well as a set of coordinating 
routines to manage these activities. However, as the alliance portfolio size grows, the 
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 boundedly rational managers have limited time and effort in each alliance routine, 
resulting in lower service quality. Thus, given the potential alliance benefits to the 
firm, I expect a negative relationship between alliance portfolio size and service 
quality. 
 
H 1 :  alliance portfolio size is negatively related to service quality. 
Multilateral alliance 
 
By definition, each alliance involves at least two partners. As defined earlier, 
an alliance that involves more than two partners is referred to as a multilateral alliance. 
In some circumstances, an alliance requires the involvement of multiple partners to 
obtain greater alliance benefits. Participating in multilateral alliances has become a 
popular practice. Makino and Beamish (1999) found that 55% of the 737 alliances in 
their study are multilateral alliances. For example, Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and 
Oneworld alliances enable airlines to reach broader markets and contain costs by 
sharing facilities or joint purchasing input materials. 
When participating in multilateral alliances, firms face higher complexity than 
in bilateral alliances, which may incur substantial impacts on the focal firm’s service 
quality. Zeng and Chen (2003) argued that multilateral alliances differ from bilateral 
alliances in several aspects. In multilateral alliances, a partner is more likely to free 
ride and to realize its own private benefits rather than the alliance’s common benefits. 
Since achieving higher quality service incurs organizational efforts and costs (Roth & 
Jackson, 1995) and opportunistic behaviors are more difficult to detect in multilateral 
alliances (Zeng & Chen, 2003), a partner in a multilateral alliance is more likely to 
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 avoid the efforts and costs of providing quality services for other partners. Also, 
Gulati and Singh (1998) noted that as the number of partners increases in an alliance, 
the level of trust between partners may be lower. In multilateral alliances, trust 
building is more difficult because it is less likely that a large group of partners will 
trust all others in the alliance.  
Greater interim interdependence in multilateral alliances requires more 
coordination efforts (Zeng & Chen, 2003). Because partners in an alliance depend on 
each other’s contributions, as the number of partners in an alliance becomes large, 
interdependence in the service production and delivery process grows. According to 
information processing theory, interdependence is positively related to the amount of 
information a focal partner needs to collect, interpret and process (Bergh, 1998). 
Altogether, these factors may constrain managers’ capabilities in ensuring service 
quality as the proportion of multilateral alliances in an alliance portfolio increases.  
 
H2: multilateral alliance ratio is negatively related to service quality. 
Alliance partner country diversity  
 
Allying with foreign partners allows firms to expand market access, and obtain 
economies of economies of scale or scope. For instance, airlines form both 
competitor-dominated alliances (e.g., with international airlines) and 
channel-dominated alliances (e.g., with international travel agents, foreign hotel 
chains) with foreign partners. Such alliances involve collaborations with managers 
from with different national, cultural, social, political, and economic backgrounds.  
I define alliance country diversity as the number of unique countries in which 
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 the partners in the focal firms’ alliance portfolio are based. I expect that alliance 
partner country diversity of an alliance portfolio has negative effects on service 
quality for two reasons. First, there are greater relational risks because partners from 
different countries have different trust propensity. Parkhe (1993) suggested that trust 
is highly “culture-specific.” Second, misunderstandings and mistakes are likely to 
occur as country diversity increases. Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti (1997) stated that 
when alliance managers share similar macroculture, the interfirm coordination is 
easier and more effective. They explained,  
…macroculture specifies roles, role relationships, and conventions—accepted 
approaches and solutions to problems—to be employed by participants; thus 
macroculture coordinates interdependent activities among independent entities so 
that complex task may be completed. …Macroculture evolves out of the 
institutional and national culture. (p. 929) 
Similar institutional and cultural backgrounds may reduce misunderstanding between 
the partners, and reduce coordination difficulties.  
In addition, collaborating with a large number of foreign partners exposes the 
firm to higher environmental uncertainty, which may also constrain managers’ ability 
to manage the service production (Bergh, 1998). Together, these arguments suggest 
that alliance partner country diversity may increase the level of alliance complexity 
and thus have negative effects on customer service quality. 
 
H3: alliance partner country diversity in a focal firm’s alliance portfolio is 
negatively related to service quality such that the higher alliance partner country 
diversity is, the lower its service quality is. 
Alliance type  
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Alliance is a generic term that covers a wide range of collaborative 
relationships such as equity joint ventures, licensing arrangements, shared product 
development projects, minority equity relationships, and joint purchasing and 
manufacturing (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Inkpen, 2001). Different types of 
alliances affect the firm’s performance differently, since “the nature and type of 
resource allocation will be different, as will be competitive dynamics, bargaining 
power, and performance measure” (Inkpen, 2001, p. 411). Researchers have used 
different typologies to classify alliances such as horizontal versus vertical alliances 
(Kotabe & Swan, 1995), exploration versus exploitation alliances (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2006), link versus scale alliances (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000, 
2004), and channel-dominated versus competitor-dominated alliances (Rindfleish & 
Moorman, 2003).  
In this dissertation, I use channel-dominated and competitor-dominated 
alliance typology. Rindfleish and Moorman (2003) defined a channel-dominated 
alliance as an alliance in which the majority of its partners are from other industries. 
They defined a competitor-dominated alliance as an alliance that is mostly composed 
of competitors in the focal firm’s industry. They found that the decision to 
participating in channel-dominated versus competitor-dominated alliances has 
significant impact on firms’ customer orientation.  
In the airline industry, airlines form competitor-dominated alliances with small 
and large, domestic and global airlines to increase hub traffic, expand market access 
and reduce costs. Also, airlines form many channel-dominated alliances with firms 
from other industries such as travel agents, hotel chains, car rental companies, and 
credit card companies to provide related services.  
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 White and Lui (2005) noted that the differences in alliance task scope and 
complexity are associated with different level of alliance management challenges. 
Further, in this dissertation, competitor-dominated airline alliances are classified into 
backward competitor-dominated and forward competitor-dominated alliances to 
capture the different level of alliance management challenges. Backward 
competitor-dominated alliances focus on the supply activities on an airline’s value 
chain (e.g., joint resource purchase), whereas forward competitor-dominated alliances 
involve direct interactions with customers (e.g., code sharing, joint baggage 
handlings). For instance, a code sharing alliance, which directly interacts with 
customers, involves more intense interfirm coordination effort and higher 
involvement of employees of partner airlines than does a channel-dominated alliance 
(e.g., an alliance with hotels, car rental companies) or a backward 
competitor-dominated alliance (e.g., an alliance between airlines to jointly purchase 
fuels).  
What is the relationship between alliance types and service quality? I expect 
that backward competitor-dominated alliances are associated with the least amount of 
alliance management complexity, channel-dominated alliances with the moderate and 
forward competitor-dominated alliances with the greatest. In other words, backward 
competitor-dominated alliances are least negatively related to service quality, 
channel-dominated alliances are moderately negatively related to service quality, and 
forward competitor-dominated alliances are most negatively related to service quality 
for several reasons. First, forward competitor-dominated alliances, such as code 
sharing and joint baggage handling that involve the highest level of intensity of 
interfirm coordination and employee interactions with customers, require the highest 
amount of managerial coordination effort. Second, in contrast, backward 
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 competitor-dominated alliances focus primarily on cost containments through joint 
resource purchase and technical maintenance arrangements, which do not require 
intense coordination or direct customer interactions, thus may require little managerial 
time and attention. Third, channel-dominated alliances are only moderately complex 
to manage. In channel-dominated alliances such as alliances with hotels, an airline 
does not have to involve a large number of employees to intensely coordinate alliance 
activities, or adjust its core operations to accommodate its partners’ operations as 
usually the case in forward competitor-dominated alliances. But a channel-dominated 
alliance requires a higher level of coordination efforts than does backward 
competitor-dominated alliances, because a channel-dominated alliance involves 
interactions with customers. 
However, a close examination of the data suggests that nearly 70% of alliances 
are forward competitor-dominated alliances. Since it may be possible that most of the 
variances in customer service quality may be accounted for by forward 
competitor-dominated alliances, I compare only the effects of the proportion of 
backward competitor-dominated alliances in an alliance portfolio with that of 
channel-dominated alliances on service quality such that 
 
H4: backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio is less negatively 
related to customer service quality than channel-dominated alliance ratio.  
Alliance experience 
 
Allying per se does not automatically lead to alliance benefits because the 
relational and performance risks may dampen the anticipated alliance benefits. 
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 Managing these risks is a difficult organizational activity due to the inherent 
complexities and uncertainties. Firms differ systematically in their capabilities of 
managing alliances (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006). Therefore, alliance management 
capability, defined as “a firm’s ability to effectively manage multiple alliances” 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006, p. 403), is a key source of competitive advantage.  
Most of the research on alliance management capability investigates whether 
alliance management capability is primarily derived from alliance experiences. The 
notion of alliance experience is that firms may learn to effectively manage alliances. 
For example, in an interview about Continental’s upcoming alliance formation with 
Northwest, Mr. Gregory Brenneman, the Continental’s president and chief operating 
officer, said “When we started with America West, we were earning our bachelor’s 
degrees…Today, we have our Ph.D.s” (McCartney, 1998, p. B.1). 
Learning theory suggests that the absorptive capability of the firm depends on 
its existing stock of knowledge (Anand & Khanna, 2000). Cohen and Levinthal (1990, 
p. 128) suggested that “prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the 
value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These 
abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm’s absorptive capability.” 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) argued that firms with more alliance experience have 
higher absorptive capability in learning to manage alliances, because firms learn to 
effectively manage relational risks and performance risks by building interfirm trust, 
becoming more informed about the operational models of the alliances, and setting up 
routines to solve conflicts.   
Recent research suggests that alliance experience has significant positive 
effects on alliance performance. For example, Zollo and Winter (2002) found that 
alliance experience with the same partner over time positively impacted the alliance 
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 performance of subsequent alliance between these two partners. Rothaermel and 
Deeds (2006) found that a firm’s alliance experience improves its product innovations. 
Reuer, Zollo and Singh (2002) reported that firms with alliance experiences in similar 
technological fields are less likely to engage in post formation governance changes in 
a subsequent alliance. Anand and Khanna (2000) found that firms with greater prior 
alliance experience have significantly higher stock market returns from alliance 
announcements than firms without alliance experience. Simonin (1997) found that 
firms with greater alliance experience have higher abilities to effectively select 
alliance partners and manage alliance conflicts.  
In sum, I believe that firms with more general alliance experience have higher 
alliance management capabilities and are thus more effective in managing alliances. 
This dissertation focuses on the moderating effects of general alliance experience 
rather than relation-specific alliance experience, because there is evidence that general 
alliances may account for more variations in alliance performance. For example, 
Hoang and Rothaermel (2005) found that the general alliance experience has positive 
effects on biotechnology firm’s innovations rather than relation-specific alliance 
experience. Thus, alliance experience may increase business process capabilities in 
selecting partners, building interfirm trust, setting up effective interfirm routines in 
the process of joint producing and delivering a product or a service (Ray, Barney & 
Muhanna, 2004). Hence, firms with more alliance experience may be more effective 
in managing alliances to ensure service quality. 
 
H5: alliance experience moderates the direct effects of alliance portfolio 
attributes on service quality such that firms with more alliance experience are more 
effective in managing alliances to ensure service quality. 
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 Specifically, in this dissertation, I examine the moderating effects of alliance 
experience on the relationship between alliance portfolio size and customer service 
quality and the relationship between multilateral alliance ratio and customer 
service quality. Thus, I further hypothesize 
 
H5a: as alliance experience increases, the relationship between alliance 
portfolio size and customer service quality becomes more positive (or less 
negative). 
H5b: as alliance experience increases, the relationship between multilateral 
alliance ratio and customer service quality becomes more positive (or less 
negative). 
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 CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This chapter focuses on the research methodology employed to test the 
hypotheses and consists of two sections. The first section describes the detailed 
procedure of data collection and variable measurements. The second section presents 
the hypotheses testing procedures and results.  
Data Collection  
Sample 
The hypotheses were tested on a sample of nine U.S. major airlines over a 
20-year period between 1988 and 2007, which include American Airlines, America 
West, Alaska, Continental, Delta, Southwest, Northwest, United Airlines and U.S. 
Airways. According to DOT’s definition, an airline is classified as major if it has at 
least one percent of total U.S. domestic passenger revenues. These nine major airlines 
were selected because their data are most continuously available throughout the 
20-year period under investigation except for America West that was acquired by U.S. 
Airways in 2006. Also, other researchers have used these nine airlines in their 
longitudinal studies related to customer service (e.g., Lapre & Tsikriktsis, 2006; Luo, 
2007). 
The timeframe between 1988 and 2007 was chosen for two reasons. First, only 
after 1988 the data pertaining to the four dimensions of customer service quality are 
consistently available from DOT’s air travel consumer reports. Beginning October, 
1987, DOT required major airlines to report their monthly statistics of mishandled 
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 baggage, involuntary denied boarding, on-time arrival and consumer complaints. 
Second, the SDC database, the source from which the alliance data were collected, 
provides consistent and reliable alliance formation information only after 1988 
(Sampson, 2007).  
Measures  
Dependent variable 
 
To study the temporal effects of alliance formation on customer service quality, 
quarterly service data were collected with a three-month lag after alliance data. Since 
this is the first study that examines the alliance portfolio effects on customer service 
quality using longitudinal archival data, the extant literature does not provide 
guidance on the appropriate length of lag between the alliance and the customer 
service quality data. I chose the three-month lag because recently Lapre and 
Tsikriktsis (2006) chose a three-month lag to study how the U.S. airlines improve 
customer satisfaction, also using the data published in the DOT air travel consumer 
reports. 
The quarterly service quality data were collected from Airline Travel 
Consumer Reports published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
between 1988 and 2007. Four key dimensions of service quality were used to measure 
airline service quality, which are on-time arrival, involuntary denied boarding, 
mishandled baggage, and consumer complaints. These four dimensions are widely 
used to study airline services. For example, the popular Airline Quality Ratings (AQR) 
created by Brent Bowen and Dean Headley in 1991 also uses these four dimensions to 
measure airline customer service quality. Bowen and Headley (1991) argued that 
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 different from the SERVQUAL approach that relies on customers’ subjective 
evaluation of the airline services, these four dimensions of airline customer service 
quality provide consistent, comparable and objective data, thus, offering advantages 
over “soft” survey data in conducting longitudinal analyses.  
Instead of creating an aggregate measure of airline service quality like AQR, 
this dissertation tests the hypotheses on each of the four dimensions independently for 
two reasons. The first reason pertains to AQR’s weighting problem. AQR’s weighting 
of each of the four dimensions was based on opinions derived from a survey of airline 
industry experts. Yet, these industry experts may view the importance of these 
dimensions differently than actual consumers. Second, testing these alliance effects 
these four dimensions separately may reveal richer insights, because it may be 
possible that alliances affect each dimension differently. Other airline service quality 
researchers have also studied each dimension independently. For example, 
Waguespack et al. (2007) compared key service quality dimensions between EU 
major airlines and US major airlines and found that US major airlines have lower 
on-time arrival rate but better baggage handling rate than their EU counterparts. Since 
this dissertation adopts the perspective of service as a total experience (Bowen & Ford, 
2002), studying each dimension independently allows this dissertation to detect 
possible different alliance effects on each of them.  
The data pertaining to these four dimensions between 1998 and 2007 were 
collected from DOT’s official website (http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/). Since the data 
published on DOT’s official website begin from 1998, the data between 1988 and 
1997 were obtained from microfiche films. Next, I introduce the definitions and data 
collection of these four dimensions. 
Consumer complaints 
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 This statistic is the quarterly average number of complaints per 100,000 
passengers. Passengers could file complaints directly with DOT by mail, phone, or in 
person. The DOT consumer complaint report covers a wide range of service quality 
issues in 12 categories, including flight problems (such as cancellations, delays), 
oversales, reservations, ticketing, boarding, fares, refunds, baggage, customer service, 
disability, advertising, discrimination, animals and others. Where quarterly data were 
not available, the quarterly average was calculated based on monthly data. 
Involuntary denied boarding 
DOT defines it as the number of denied boardings per 10,000 passengers who 
are denied boarding an oversold flight despite their confirmed reservations. This 
statistic does not include passengers who are affected by cancelled, delayed or 
diverted flights. Quarterly data were available and collected. 
On-time arrival 
This statistic is the percentage of flights that arrive on time. According to DOT, 
a flight is "on time" if it arrives less than 15 minutes after the scheduled time shown 
in the carriers' Computerized Reservations Systems (CRS). In fulfilling DOT’s data 
reporting requirements, the reporting airlines are required to use automated and/or 
manual systems for collecting flight data. The data of quarterly rate of on-time 
arrivals were available and collected.  
 
Mishandled baggage 
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 This statistic refers to the rate of mishandled baggage (i.e., lost, damaged, 
delayed or pilfered baggage) per 1,000 passengers. Quarterly data were not available 
for this dimension. The quarterly average rate was calculated based on monthly 
mishandled baggage data.  
Bowen and Headley (1999) noted that these four dimensions are a valid proxy 
measure of the latent customer service quality construct, but differ in their 
relationships to customer service quality. Put differently, the number of customer 
complaints per 100,000 passengers, the number of denied boardings per 10,000 
passengers, and the rate of mishandled baggage per 1,000 passengers are negatively 
related to service quality, while on-time arrival rate is positively related to service 
quality.  
 
Independent and moderating variables 
 
The data pertaining to alliance variables were collected from Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database, a database widely used in alliance research (e.g., Oxley & 
Sampson, 2004; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2006; Sampson, 2007) and is one of the most 
comprehensive sources of information on alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000). SDC 
collects the alliance formation announcements and updates the alliance status daily 
based on popular media publications such as SEC filings, trade publications, and 
newswire sources. SDC provides comprehensive alliance details, such as contract type, 
nationality of the partner, SIC code of the alliance partners, name of each partners, 
description of the industry of the partners, synopsis of the alliance activities, and 
alliance status (i.e., terminated, renegotiated, extended, expired, completed). Also, 
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 Anand and Khanna (2000) noted that the SDC alliance information is highly reliable 
and consistent with other sources. For example, they found that SDC’s alliance SIC 
codes accurate and consistent with LexisNexis database. Although there have been 
some concerns about SDC’s accuracy of announcement dates, Anand and Khanna 
(2000) found that in most cases, the discrepancy of SDC reported dates is within a 
few days, or at most one or two months, after they verified SDC announcement dates 
with various news sources, (e.g., news and wire reports, newspapers, magazines and 
trade journals). Since this study examines the quarterly alliance portfolio effects 
instead of monthly, the date discrepancy is not a serious issue for this dissertation.  
 
Alliance portfolio size 
The alliance portfolio size variable was operationalized as the logarithm of the 
cumulative number of alliances each airline has each quarter. When an alliance 
formation announcement is made and its alliance status is “completed and signed,” 
the alliance was added to the alliance portfolio. When the alliance status indicates 
subsequently “expired or terminated,” that alliance was counted off the airline’s 
alliance portfolio size accordingly. For example, when British Airways and American 
Airlines terminated their alliance in November 1998, that alliance was subtracted 
from American Airlines’ alliance portfolio size in the fourth quarter of 1998. 
 
Multilateral alliance 
 Following Gulati and Singh (1998), an alliance was coded as a multilateral 
alliance if the alliance involves more than two partners. An alliance was coded as a 
bilateral alliance if it involves only two partners. Multilateral alliance ratio was 
calculated as the number of existing multilateral alliances divided by alliance 
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 portfolio size.  
 
Partner country diversity  
 Following Goerzen and Beamish (2005), I first measured alliance partner 
country diversity as the number of partners from unique countries in an alliance 
portfolio. For example, if several alliance partners in an airline’s alliance portfolio are 
from the same foreign country, they were counted as one unique foreign country. Each 
foreign country was counted only once as a unique country in the measure of partner 
country diversity. Partner country diversity ratio was calculated as the number of 
unique countries in which partners are based divided by alliance portfolio size. 
 
Alliance type: Channel-dominated alliance ratio vs. backward competitor- 
dominated alliance ratio 
Following Rindfleish and Moorman (2003), when an alliance involves 
partners from other industries (e.g., credit card companies, car rental services, and 
hotels), it was coded as a channel-dominated alliance. For example, in December, 
1991, Busch Entertainment and American Airlines signed a marketing agreement in 
which American Airlines was named as the official domestic airlines for seven of the 
nine Busch Entertainment theme parks. Competitor-dominated alliances are alliances 
formed primarily between airlines (Rindfleish & Moorman, 2003). When a 
competitor-dominated alliance formation focuses on the input supply and does not 
have direct impact on customers (e.g., joint purchase of fuel, joint fleet maintenance), 
the alliance was coded as a backward competitor-dominated alliance. The ratio of 
each alliance type was calculated against alliance portfolio size. 
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 Alliance experience 
Some researchers have used the number count of prior alliance relationships to 
measure alliance experience (e.g., Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Zollo et al., 2002). Yet, 
that approach overlooks the learning effects of alliance duration of each alliance. 
Therefore, I followed Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) to measure general alliance 
experience as an airline’s cumulative durations of each alliance and calculated the 
alliance experience variable on an annual basis. For example, if an airline has four 
alliances up to the year of analysis, among which two alliances have lasted 2 years, 
one 10 years, and another 12 years, then the alliance experience score is calculated as 
2*2+1*10+1*12=26. 
 
Moderating variables  
Alliance portfolio size*alliance experience and multilateral alliance ratio* 
alliance experience are the interaction terms to examine the hypothesized moderation 
effects of alliance experience. Following recommendations by Cohen, Cohen, West 
and Aiken (2003), each independent variable was mean centered before they were 
entered into the models. To check multicollinearity, I conducted post regression 
analyses and found that all VIFs were below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity was 
not a severe problem for these interaction terms (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Hair 
1998). 
 
Control variables  
 
To control for the alternative explanations of the variances in the dependent 
variables, this study includes four control variables that are firm size, airline type, 
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 temporal control for September 11th, 2001, and repeat alliances. 
 
Firm size  
Since larger airlines may have higher management complexity (Lapre & 
Tsikriktsis, 2006) and form more alliances, I used the logarithm of quarterly average 
number of employees as the proxy for firm size. Quarterly employee data from 1990 
to 2007 were obtained directly from the DOT office. Because only annual employee 
data between 1988 and 1989 were available from DOT’s Airline Employment Data 
reports, quarterly data were interpolated for these two years. 
 
Airline type 
Airlines can be classified into either focused or full-service airlines. Lapre and 
Tsikriktsis (2006) argued that focused airlines may learn faster than full-service 
airlines to achieve higher level of customer satisfaction, because focused airlines have 
a simplified operation, thus facilitating their coordination. Following Lapre and 
Tsikriktsis (2006), Alaska, America West, and Southwest were coded focused airlines 
because they focus on operations in North America only. American Airlines, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, United Airlines and US Airways were coded 
full-service airlines because they operate both continental and intercontinental routes.  
 
Terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 
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 The third control is a dummy variable that controls for the effects of the 
terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001. Rhoades and Waguespack (2004) compared 
the U.S. airline service quality between 1987 and 2002, and found that airline service 
quality improved in terms of on-time arrival, and reduced both involuntary denied 
boarding and customer complaints after the terrorist attack in 2001. They explained 
this improvement due to decreased passenger volume and consumers’ lower 
propensity to complain as a result of their heightened concern over safety issues.  
 
Repeat alliance  
Fourth, I control for repeat alliances, because alliance with the same partner 
may suggest lower alliance management risks due to higher interfirm trust and more 
effective relation-specific routines of coordinating resources (Sampson, 2005). This 
variable was measured as the number of existing alliances in an alliance portfolio that 
involves at least one previous partner. 
A total of 351 alliance announcements were obtained from SDC databases. To 
match the service quality data with the alliance data, I applied the three-month data 
lag as described earlier. Six hundred one observations (firm-quarter data entries) were 
coded for the nine airlines over the 20-year period. Table 5 provides the summary 
statistics and variable correlations. I conducted the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
analyses of all the independent and moderating variables and found all the VIF values 
were below 10. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a severe issue in this study 
(Hair et al., 1998).  
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 Hypotheses Testing  
 
To test the hypotheses, I used random effects panel data regression (also 
known as random effects cross-sectional time series regressions) in Stata 10 (xtreg 
procedure). Random effects regressions relax the assumption that firm specific effects 
are correlated with the predictors in the model (Greene, 2003). I chose this analysis 
procedure because the Hausman’s test results of the models did not suggest that fixed 
effects regressions are more efficient (Greene, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002).   
Tables 5-16 provide the test results of the hypotheses. Each hypothesis was 
separately tested on each of the four dimensions of customer service quality (i.e., 
customer complaints, involuntary denied boarding, mishandled baggage, and on-time 
arrival) in a hierarchical fashion. First, models 1, 3, 5, and 7 are the baseline models 
with the control variables only. In models 2, 4, 6 and 8, the independent variables or 
interaction terms were entered to test the hypotheses. The odd number Tables (i.e., 
Tables 5, 7, 9, 1, 13, and 15) report the results that use customer complaints and 
mishandled baggage as dependent variables in the models, while even number Tables 
(i.e., Tables 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16) report the results that include on-time arrival and 
involuntary denied boarding as dependent variables.   
Hypothesis 1: Alliance portfolio size 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a negative relationship between alliance portfolio size 
and customer service quality such that as alliance portfolio size increases, customer 
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 service quality decreases. Tables 5 and 6 present the analyses results pertaining to 
hypothesis 1. 
 
Customer complaint 
The results of model 2 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.135, Chi 
square = 87.4, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 49.887, p < 
0.01) were significant after alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the 
control variables in model 1. Alliance portfolio size (beta = 0.322, p < 0.01) was 
significantly positively related to customer complaints, lending support to H1. 
 
Mishandled baggage 
The results of model 4 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.081, Chi 
square = 80.12, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F=18.654, p < 
0.01) were significant after alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the 
control variables in model 3. Yet, alliance portfolio size (beta = -0.312, p < 0.01) was 
negatively related to mishandled baggage. This result suggests that as alliance 
portfolio size increases, mishandled baggage rate decreases, thus inconsistent with 
H1. 
 
On-time arrival 
The results of model 6 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.135, Chi 
square = 87.40, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 21.673, p < 
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0.01) were significant after alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the 
control variables in model 5. Alliance portfolio size (beta = -0.022, p < 0.01) was 
found negatively related to on-time arrival. This result suggests that as alliance 
portfolio size increases, on-time arrival rate deteriorates, thus lending support to H1. 
 
Involuntary denied boarding 
The results of model 8 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.195, Chi 
square = 88.43, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 15.594, p < 
0.01) were significant after the alliance portfolio size was entered in addition to the 
control variables in model 7. Alliance portfolio size (beta = -0.170, p < 0.01) was 
found negatively related to involuntary denied boarding. This suggests that as alliance 
portfolio size increases, involuntary denied boarding rate decreases, thus inconsistent 
with H1. 
In sum, H1 results indicate that alliance portfolio size has significantly 
negative effects on customer service quality with respect to customer complaints and 
on-time arrival but not on mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding. 
 Table 4: Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Customer complaint it1 1.272 1.087        
2 Mishandled baggageit1 5.156 1.465 0.123***       
3 On-time arrivalit1 0.78 0.055 -0.386*** -0.342***      
4 Involuntary denied boarding it1 1.004 0.874 -0.002 0.045 -0.114***     
5 Alliance portfolio size it0 (log) 2.469 1.183 0.115*** -0.153*** -0.155* -0.196***    
6 Multilateral alliance ratio it0 0.175 0.163 -0.084** 0.163*** -0.008 -0.186*** 0.035   
 7 Partner country diversity ratio it0 0.421 0.24 0.162*** 0.096** -0.023 -0.203*** 0.284*** 0.020 
8 Channel-dominated alliance  
ratio it0 
5.058 5.759 0.021 -0.050 -0.054 -0.131*** 0.737*** 0.051 0.056 
9 Backward competitor-dominated 
alliance ratio it0 
1.891 2.229 0.069* 0.023 -0.091* -0.146*** 0.734*** 0.074* 0.135*** 
10 Alliance experience it0 111.085 142.572 0.018 -0.019 -0.146 -0.048 0.768* 0.079 0.095
11 Alliance portfolio size it0 (log)* 
Alliance experience it0 
96.358 135.065 -0.111*** 0.321*** 0.0282 -0.051 -0.063 0.279* 0.002 
12 Multilateral alliance ratio it0* 
Alliance experience it0 
-0.915 17.636 0.044 -0.115*** -0.0657 0.091** 0.132*** -0.678*** 0.165*** 
 No. of observations = 601; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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   Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Country diversity it0 *Alliance 
experience it0 
-2.769 20.229 0.110*** -0.046 0.039 -0.138*** -0.287*** 0.126*** -0.489*** 
14 Firm sizeit1 (log) 10.578 0.716 0.049 0.176*** 0.108* -0.377*** 0.364* 0.117*** 0.487*** 
15 Airline type 0.739 0.44 0.094** 0.247*** 0.041 -0.327*** 0.378*** 0.226*** 0.705*** 
16 Repeat allianceit0 4.656 6.498 0.023 -0.045 -0.097* -0.026 0.731*** 0.133*** 0.062 
17 September 11th, 2001 0.338 0.474 -0.220*** -0.189*** 0.023 -0.043 0.509*** 0.004 -0.170*** 
 No. of observations = 601; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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    Mean SD 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
0.438*** 
9 Backward 
competitor-dominated  
alliance ratio 
1.891 2.229 0.736***               
No. of observations = 601; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
10 Alliance experience it0 111.085 142.572 0.802*** 0.784***               
11 Alliance portfolio size 
it0 (log)* Alliance 
experience it0 
96.358 135.065 0.288*** 0.227*** 0.431***             
12 Multilateral alliance 
ratio it0* Alliance 
experience it0   
-0.915 17.636 0.111*** 0.047 -.000 -0.301***           
13 Country diversity 
it0*Alliance 
experience it0 
-2.769 20.229 -0.146*** -0.182*** -0.283*** -0.062 -0.211***         
14 Firm sizeit1 (log) 10.578 0.716 0.395*** 0.572*** 0.277*** 0.284*** -0.004 -0.054       
15 Airline type  
0.739 0.44 0.268*** 0.423*** 0.335*** 0.339*** -0.036 -0.119*** 0.820***     
16 Repeat allianceit0 4.656 6.498 0.633*** 0.822*** 0.866*** 0.286*** -0.031 -0.264*** 0.342*** 0.341***   
17 September 11th, 2001 
0.338 0.474 0.580*** 0.383*** 0.644*** 0.236***  0.020 -0.158*** -0.123*** -0.081* 
  
 
 
Table 5: Hypotheses 1, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage 
 Model 1 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 2 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 3 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Model 4 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Control variables     
Airline type 0.090 0.135 2.759*** 2.685*** 
 (0.239) (0.224) (0.475) (0.509) 
Firm size it1 (log) -0.096 -0.288** -1.405*** -1.231*** 
 (0.145) (0.140) (0.264) (0.288) 
September 11th, 2001 -0.734*** -0.992*** -0.479*** -0.253 
 (0.106) (0.113) (0.148) (0.161) 
No. of repeat alliance it1 0.045*** 0.011 -0.029** 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) 
Independent variable     
Portfolio size it0 (log)  0.322***  -0.312*** 
  (0.057)  (0.0813) 
Constant 2.253 3.705*** 18.27*** 17.00*** 
 (1.407) (1.345) (2.560) (2.771) 
     
     
Overall R2 0.062 0.135 0.053 0.081 
Chi square 52.80*** 87.40*** 63.43*** 80.12*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 49.887***    18.654*** 
  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 601 
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Table 6: Hypothesis 1, DVs- On-time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding 
 Model 5 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 6 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 7 
Involuntary 
denied 
boardingit1 
Model 8 
Involuntary 
denied 
boardingit1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.028 -0.059** 0.256 0.083 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.327) (0.354) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.038*** 0.073*** -0.911*** -0.706*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.164) (0.181) 
September 11th, 2001 0.025*** 0.045*** -0.518*** -0.382*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.083) (0.091) 
No. of repeat alliance 
it1 
-0.003*** -0.001 0.048*** 0.068*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) 
Independent variable     
Portfolio size it0 (log)  -0.022***  -0.170*** 
  (0.003)  (0.046) 
Constant 0.407*** 0.092 10.40*** 8.631*** 
 (0.110) (0.120) (1.597) (1.739) 
     
Overall R2 .062 0.135 0.174 0.195 
Chi square 52.80** 87.40** 75.21*** 88.43*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 21.673*** 
 
   15.594*** 
 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 601 
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 Hypothesis 2: Multilateral alliance ratio 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the multilateral alliance ratio of an alliance 
portfolio is negatively related to customer service quality. Since SDC alliance 
database did not report any multilateral alliance formation by America West and 
Southwest over the 20-year period, in testing H2 to better detect the effects of 
multilateral alliance formation on service quality, America West and Southwest were 
removed from the sample. The resultant number of observations is 495 for testing H2. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the analyses results of H2.  
 
Customer complaint 
The results of model 2 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.112, Chi square 
= 61.35, p < 0.01) was significant, but the incremental change in R square (F = 3.571, 
p < 0.10) was only marginally significant after the multilateral alliance ratio was 
entered in addition to the control variables in model 1. The multilateral alliance ratio 
(F = -0.510, p < 0.10) was only marginally negatively related to customer complaint, 
inconsistent with H2. 
 
Mishandled baggage 
Although the results of model 4 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 
0.118, Chi square = 65.18, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 
35.015, p < 0.01) were significant after the multilateral alliance ratio was entered, the 
multilateral alliance ratio (F = 0.412, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to 
mishandled baggage, lending no support to H2. 
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 On-time arrival 
The results of model 6 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.114, Chi square 
= 63.06, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 18.239, p < 0.01) 
were significant after the multilateral alliance ratio was entered. Multilateral alliance 
ratio (beta = 0.041, p < 0.01) was positively related to on-time arrival. This result 
suggests that as an airline increasingly participates in multilateral alliances, its 
on-time arrival rate is higher, thus inconsistent with H2. 
 
Involuntary denied boarding 
The results of model 8 suggest that the overall model (R2 = 0.211, Chi square 
=130.72, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 16.273, p < 0.01) 
were significant after multilateral alliance ratio was entered. Multilateral alliance ratio 
(beta = -0.812, p < 0.01) was negatively related to involuntary denied boarding. This 
result suggests that as airlines increasingly participate in multilateral alliances, their 
involuntary denied boarding is lower, thus inconsistent with H2. 
Taken together, the test results suggest that multilateral alliance ratio is not 
negatively related to any of the four service quality dimensions. Thus, H2 is not 
supported. 
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Table 7: Hypothesis 2, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage 
 Model 1 
Customer 
complaintit1
Model 2 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 3 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Model 4 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Control variables     
Airline type 0.086 -0.031 3.509*** 0.904** 
 (0.235) (0.242) (0.739) (0.395) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.022 0.049 -1.645*** -0.010 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.346) (0.196) 
September 11th, 
2001 
-0.624*** -0.611*** -0.498** -0.082 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.203) (0.188) 
No. of repeat 
alliance it1 
-0.011 -0.009 0.045** 0.038** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.015) 
Independent 
variables 
    
Portfolio size it0 
(log) 
0.255*** 0.240*** -0.477*** -0.555*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.092) (0.090) 
Multilateral 
alliance ratioit0 
 -0.510*  0.412 
  (0.270)  (0.441) 
Constant 0.562 0.519 21.00*** 5.794*** 
 (1.115) (1.112) (3.219) (1.815) 
     
Observations 495 495 495 495 
Overall R2 0.105 0.112 0.055 0.118 
Chi square 57.49*** 61.35*** 89.29*** 65.18*** 
F-value for 
change in R2 
 3.571*  35.015*** 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 495 
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Table 8: Hypothesis 2, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding 
 Model 5 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 6 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 7 
Involuntary 
denied boardingit1 
Model 8 
Involuntary 
denied boardingit1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.002 0.054*** 0.446** 0.261 
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.177) (0.181) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.039*** 0.006 -0.630*** -0.588*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.090) (0.090) 
September 11th, 
2001 
0.032*** 0.018*** -0.152* -0.131 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.087) (0.086) 
No. of repeat 
alliance it1 
-0.001 -0.000 0.042*** 0.0445*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) 
Independent 
variables 
    
Portfolio size it0 
(log) 
-0.015*** -0.012*** -0.126*** -0.150*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.041) (0.041) 
Multilateral 
alliance ratio it0 
 0.041***  -0.812*** 
  (0.016)  (0.201) 
Constant 0.396*** 0.680*** 7.400*** 7.332*** 
 (0.103) (0.065) (0.841) (0.829) 
     
Overall R2 0.081 0.114 0.185 0.211 
Chi square 53.61*** 63.06*** 111.01*** 130.72*** 
F-value for 
change in R2 
 18.239***  16.273*** 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
No. of observations = 495 
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 Hypothesis 3: Partner country diversity ratio 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative relationship between partner country 
diversity ratio and customer service quality. Since SDC did not report that Southwest 
had formed alliances with any foreign partners between 1988 and 2007, in testing H3, 
Southwest was removed from the sample. The resultant number of observations was 
552. Tables 9 and 10 present the test results of hypothesis 3.  
 
Customer complaint 
The results of model 2 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.116, Chi square 
= 71.83, p < 0.01) was significant, but the incremental change in R square (F = 0.006, 
p > 0. 10) was not significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered. Also, 
partner country diversity ratio (F = 0.287, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to 
customer complaint, providing no support to H3. 
 
Mishandled baggage 
The results of model 4 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.077, Chi square = 
71.83, p < 0.01), but the incremental change in R square (F = -9.401, p > 0.10) was 
not significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered. Also, partner country 
diversity ratio (F = -0.304, p < 0.1) was not significantly related to mishandled 
baggage, providing no support to H3.  
 
On-time arrival 
Although the results of model 6 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 
0.090, Chi square = 54.05, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 
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 9.362, p < 0.01) were significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered, 
partner country diversity ratio (F = 0.009, p > 0.1) was not significantly related to 
on-time arrival, providing no support to H3. 
 
Involuntary denied boarding 
The results of model 8 show that both the overall model (R2 = 0.199, Chi 
square = 64.34, p > 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 7.501, p < 0.01) 
were significant after partner country diversity ratio was entered. Further, country 
diversity ratio (F = 7.501, p < 0.1) was found significantly positively related to 
involuntary denied boarding. This significant positive relationship suggests that as 
partner country diversity ratio increases, involuntary denied boarding rate becomes 
higher, thus lending support to H3. 
In sum, despite the three insignificant results, the results provide partial 
support to H3 in that as partner country diversity ratio increases, the involuntary 
denied boarding rate becomes higher.  
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Table 9: Hypothesis 3, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage 
 Model 1 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 2 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 3 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Model 4 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.622*** -0.591** 3.067*** 3.824*** 
 (0.237) (0.261) (0.564) (0.659) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.087 0.083 -1.298*** -1.711*** 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.305) (0.343) 
September 11th, 2001 -0.824*** -0.829*** -0.412** -0.510*** 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.177) (0.179) 
No. of repeat allianceit1 -0.017 -0.018 0.040** 0.0317* 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) 
Independent variables     
Portfolio size it0 (log) 0.351*** 0.358*** -0.460*** -0.398*** 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.086) (0.092) 
Partner country 
diversity ratio it0 
 -0.082  -0.346 
  (0.287)  (0.402) 
Constant 0.403 0.443 17.61*** 21.45*** 
 (1.279) (1.287) (2.841) (3.193) 
     
Overall R2 0.116 0.116 0.092 0.077 
Chi square 71.87*** 71.83*** 92.40*** 101.15*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 .006   -9.401 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 552 
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Table 10: Hypothesis 3, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding
 Model 5 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 6 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 7 
Involuntary 
denied 
boardingit1 
Model 8 
Involuntary 
denied 
boardingit1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.029 0.012 0.451 0.470 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.452) (0.479) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.047*** 0.015** -0.777*** -0.876*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.209) (0.219) 
September 11th, 2001 0.039*** 0.026*** -0.392*** -0.382*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.103) (0.103) 
No. of repeat alliance 
it1 
-0.001 0.000 0.066*** 0.072*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) 
Independent variables     
Portfolio size it0 (log) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.153*** -0.187*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.050) (0.052) 
Partner country 
diversity ratio it0 
 
0.009  0.445* 
  (0.015)  (0.231) 
Constant 0.343*** 0.635*** 9.004*** 9.883*** 
 (0.104) (0.068) (1.958) (2.046) 
     
Overall R2 0.075 0.090 0.188 0.199 
Chi square 69.70*** 54.05*** 61.20*** 64.34*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 9.362***  7.501*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations=552 
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 Hypothesis 4: Alliance type 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that channel-dominated alliance ratio is more 
negatively related to customer service quality than backward competitor-dominated 
alliance ratio. Since SDC did not report any backward competitor-dominated alliances 
by Alaska and America West over the 20-year period, in testing hypothesis 4, these 
two airlines were removed from the analysis in order to better detect the effects of 
alliance type on service quality. The resultant number of observations was 495. Tables 
11 and 12 present the analyses to test hypothesis 4.  
 
Customer complaint 
The results of model 2 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.201, Chi square 
= 122.62, p < 0.01) was significant and channel-dominated alliance ratio (beta = 0.683, 
p < 0.01) and backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio (beta = -0.965, p < 0.01) 
were found positively related to customer complaint. Yet, the incremental change in R 
square (F =14.569, p > 0.10) was insignificant after the channel-dominated alliance 
ratio and backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Further, a post 
regression test suggests that the coefficient difference (Chi square = 1.17, p > 0.10) 
between channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward competitor-dominated 
alliance ratio was not significant, lending no support to H4.      
 
Mishandled baggage 
      The results of model 4 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.126, Chi square 
= 70.19, p < 0.01), but the incremental change in R square (F = 37.612, p > 0.01) was 
not significant after the channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward 
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 competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Further, channel-dominated 
alliance ratio (beta = 0.946, p < 0.01) was positively related to mishandled baggage, 
but backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio (beta = 0.946, p > 0.10) was not 
significantly related to mishandled baggage. Furthermore, a post regression test 
suggests that the coefficient difference (Chi square = 2.05, p > 0.10) between 
channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio 
was not significant, thus lending no support to H4. 
 
On-time arrival 
The results of model 6 suggest that both the overall model (R2 = 0.105, Chi 
square = 57.22, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 28.570, p < 0.0 
1) were significant after the channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward 
competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Channel-dominated alliance ratio 
(beta = -.009, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to on-time arrival, but backward 
competitor-dominated alliance ratio (beta = -0.06, p < 0.01) was negatively related to 
on-time arrival. A post regression test suggests that the coefficient difference (Chi 
square = 12.03, p < 0.01) between channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward 
competitor-dominated alliance ratio was significant. This result suggests that 
backward competitor-dominated alliances are associated with lower on-time arrival 
than channel-dominated alliances, inconsistent with H4.  
 
Involuntary denied boarding 
The results of model 8 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.241, Chi 
square =154.85, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 14.314, p < 
0.01) were significant after channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward 
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 competitor-dominated alliance ratio were entered. Channel-dominated alliance ratio 
(beta = -0.675, p < 0.01) was negatively related to involuntary denied boarding but 
backward competitor-dominated alliance (beta = -0.225, p > 0.10) was not 
significantly related. A post regression test suggests that the coefficient difference 
(Chi square = 5.37, p < 0.05) between channel-dominated alliance ratio and backward 
competitor- dominated alliance ratio was more negatively related to involuntary 
denied boarding than backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio, thus lending 
support to H4. 
In sum, the results suggest that H4 is supported only when the service quality 
dimension is involuntary denied boarding rate such that increases in channel- 
dominated alliances are associated with deteriorating involuntary denied boarding 
rate.  
 
 
 
103 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Hypothesis 4, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage 
 Model 1 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 2 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 3 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Model 4 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Control variables     
Airline type 0.728*** 1.339*** 1.983*** 1.855*** 
 (0.153) (0.227) (0.509) (0.360) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.027 -0.225 -0.991*** -0.040 
 (0.117) (0.138) (0.330) (0.219) 
September 11th, 2001 -0.586*** -0.709*** -0.107 -0.031 
 (0.115) (0.122) (0.194) (0.193) 
No. of repeat allianceit1 -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 0.021 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.014) 
Independent variables     
Portfolio size it0 (log) 0.225*** 0.279*** -0.292*** -0.421*** 
 (0.052) (0.055) (0.086) (0.088) 
Channel-dominated 
alliance ratio it0 
 0.683***  0.946** 
  (0.244)  (0.386) 
Backward 
competitor-dominated  
alliance ratio it0 
 0.965***  0.356 
  (0.266)  (0.421) 
Constant -0.069 1.704 15.02*** 4.721** 
 (1.217) (1.341) (3.421) (2.121) 
     
Overall R2 0.177 0.201 0.059 0.126 
Chi square 105.31*** 122.62*** 55.35*** 70.19*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 14.569***  37.612*** 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 495 
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Table 12: Hypothesis 4, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied Boarding 
 Model 5 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 6 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 7 
Involuntary 
denied 
boardingit1 
Model 8 
Involuntary 
denied 
boardingit1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.028* -0.039*** -0.343*** -0.737*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.114) (0.170) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.039*** 0.016* -0.654*** -0.457*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.087) (0.103) 
September 11th, 2001 0.030*** 0.019*** -0.180** -0.052 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.086) (0.091) 
No. of repeat allianceit1 -0.001 0.000 0.045*** 0.037*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) 
Independent variables     
Portfolio size it0 (log) -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.134*** -0.122*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.039) (0.041) 
Channel-dominated 
alliance ratio it0 
 -0.009  -0.675*** 
  (0.014)  (0.182) 
Backward 
competitor-dominated  
alliance ratio it0 
 -0.060***  -0.225 
  (0.015)  (0.199) 
Constant 0.415*** 0.698*** 8.469*** 6.855*** 
 (0.111) (0.078) (0.908) (1.001) 
     
Overall R2 0.053 0.105 0.219 0.241 
Chi square 45.90*** 57.22*** 137.16*** 154.85*** 
F-value for change in R2  28.570***  14.314*** 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 495 
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 Hypothesis 5a: Interaction between alliance portfolio size and alliance experience 
 
H5a predicted that alliance experience moderates the effects of alliance 
portfolio size on service quality such that as alliance experience increases, the 
relationship between alliance portfolio size and service quality becomes less negative 
or more positive. Table 13 and 14 presents the analyses to test hypothesis 5a. 
 
Customer complaint 
The results of model 2 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.145, Chi 
square = 88.80, p > 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 14.569, p < 0. 
01) were significant after the alliance portfolio size*alliance experience was entered. 
Yet, the interaction term, alliance portfolio size* alliance experience (beta = -0.001, p > 
0.10), was not significantly related to customer complaint, lending no support to H5a. 
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Figure 2: Interaction Effect of Alliance Portfolio Size and Alliance Experience on 
Mishandled Baggage 
 
 
 
106 
 
  
Mishandled baggage 
The results of model 4 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.117, Chi square = 
134.20, p < 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 8.864, p < 0.01) after 
the interaction term, alliance portfolio size* alliance experience, was entered. The 
interaction term, alliance portfolio size* alliance experience (beta = 0.005, p < 0.01), 
was positively related to mishandled baggage. I followed the recommendation of 
Cohen et al. (2003) to plot the interaction in Figure 2. The plot suggests that when 
alliance experience is high, increases in alliance portfolio size lead to higher 
mishandled baggage rate, inconsistent with H5a. 
 
On-time arrival 
The results of model 6 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.134, Chi square = 
135.84, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 5.682, p < 0.05) were 
significant after alliance portfolio size *alliance experience was entered. The 
interaction term, alliance portfolio size *alliance experience (beta = -0.000, p < 0.01) 
was significantly negatively related to on-time arrival. Figure 3 plots the interaction 
and suggests that when alliance experience is low, the larger an airline’s alliance 
portfolio size, the higher on-time arrival. But when alliance experience is high, 
increases in alliance portfolio size are associated with lower on-time arrival rate. This 
is inconsistent with H5a prediction.  
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Table 13: Hypothesis 5a, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage 
 Model 1 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 2 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 3 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Model 4 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Control variables     
Airline type 0.135 -0.212 2.685*** 2.193*** 
 (0.224) (0.285) (0.509) (0.761) 
Firm size it1 (log) -0.288** -0.190 -1.231*** -1.625*** 
 (0.140) (0.172) (0.288) (0.360) 
September 11th, 
2001 
-0.992*** -1.189*** -0.253 -1.115*** 
 (0.113) (0.142) (0.161) (0.200) 
No. of repeat 
allianceit1 
0.011 0.008 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.016) (0.032) 
Independent 
variables 
    
Alliance portfolio 
size it0 (log) 
0.322*** 0.415*** -0.312*** 0.321** 
 (0.0571) (0.104) (0.081) (0.159) 
Alliance experience 
it0 
 0.000  -0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Alliance portfolio 
size it0 (log)* Alliance 
experience it0 
 0.001  0.005*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 3.705*** 2.661 17.000*** 20.050*** 
 (1.345) (1.629) (2.771) (3.432) 
     
Overall R2 0.145 0.1309   0.104 0.117 
Chi square 88.80*** 90.88*** 105.24*** 134.20*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 -9.279  8.864*** 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 601 
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Table 14: Hypothesis 5a, DVs- On-time Arrival and Involuntary Denied 
Boarding 
 Model 5 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 6 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 7 
Involuntary 
denied 
boarding it1 
Model 8 
Involuntary 
denied 
boarding it1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.059** -0.019 0.0828 0.129 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.35) (0.44) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.073*** 0.064*** -0.706*** -0.655*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.18) (0.21) 
September 11th, 
2001 
0.045*** 0.073*** -0.382*** -0.371*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.091) (0.12) 
No. of repeat 
allianceit1 
-0.001 0.001 0.068*** 0.046** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.018) 
Independent 
variables 
-0.022*** -0.037*** -0.170*** -0.267*** 
Alliance portfolio 
size it0 (log) 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.046) (0.091) 
     
Alliance experience 
it0 
 -0.000  0.002 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Alliance portfolio 
size it0 (log)* 
Alliance experience 
it0 
 -0.000***  -0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.092 0.198 8.631*** 8.289*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (1.74) (1.99) 
     
Overall R2 0.126 0.134 0.203 0.212 
Chi square 122.31*** 135.84*** 89.97*** 89.56*** 
F-value for change 
in R2 
 5.682**  6.547** 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 601 
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Figure 3: Interaction Effect of Alliance Portfolio Size and Alliance Experience 
on On-Time Arrival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Involuntary denied boarding 
 
The results of model 8 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.212, Chi square = 
89.56, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 6.547, p < 0.05) were 
significant after the interaction term, alliance portfolio size *alliance experience was 
entered. The interaction term (beta = -0.001, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to 
involuntary denied boarding, lending no support to H5a. 
In sum, the test results suggest that as alliance experience does not positively 
moderate the relationship between alliance portfolio size and customer service quality 
with respect to any of the four service dimensions. Thus, H5a was not supported.  
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 Hypothesis 5b: Interaction between multilateral alliance ratio and alliance 
experience 
 
H5b predicted that alliance experience enhances the relationship between 
multilateral alliance ratio and customer service quality. As with testing hypothesis 2, 
similarly in testing H5b, America West and Southwest were removed from the sample 
because these two airlines were not reported to have any multilateral alliances. The 
resultant number of observations is 495. Tables 15 and 16 present the analyses to test 
hypothesis 5b.  
 
Customer complaint 
The results of model 2 show that both the overall model (R2 = 0.138, Chi 
square = 78.03, p > 0.01), and the incremental change in R square (F = 5.245 p < 0.05) 
were significant after multilateral alliance ratio*alliance experience was entered. 
Multilateral alliance ratio*alliance experience (beta = -0.009, p < 0.05) was negatively 
related to customer complaint. The interaction plot is presented in Figure 4 and 
suggests that when alliance experience is high, as multilateral alliance ratio increases, 
customer complaint ratio decreases, thus lending support to H5b. 
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Figure 4: Interaction Effect of Multilateral Alliance Ratio and Alliance 
Experience on Customer Complaint  
Mishandled baggage 
The results of model 4 indicate the overall model (R2 = 0.166, Chi square = 
96.70, p < 0.01) was significant but the incremental change in R square (F = 0.058, p > 
0.10) was not significant after interaction term, multilateral alliance ratio* alliance 
experience, was entered. Further, multilateral alliance ratio * alliance experience (beta 
= -0.002, p > 0.10) was not significantly related to mishandled baggage, lending no 
support to H5b.  
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Table 15: Hypothesis 5b, DVs-Customer Complaint and Mishandled Baggage 
 Model 1 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 2 
Customer 
complaintit1 
Model 3 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Model 4 
Mishandled 
baggage it1 
Control variables     
Airline type -0.233 -0.535* 0.353 0.288 
 (0.249) (0.280) (0.399) (0.45) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.083 0.155 0.0825 0.098 
 (0.120) (0.123) (0.192) (0.20) 
September 11th, 
2001 -0.868*** -0.857*** -0.784*** -0.781*** 
 (0.141) (0.140) (0.226) (0.23) 
No. of repeat 
allianceit1 -0.036*** -0.041*** -0.034* -0.035* 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) 
Independent 
variables 
    
Alliance portfolio 
size it0 (log) 0.197*** 0.229*** -0.673*** -0.666*** 
 (0.056) (0.058) (0.090) (0.093) 
Alliance experience 
it0 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Multilateral alliance 
ratio it0 -0.524* -1.441*** 0.375 0.177 
 (0.268) (0.481) (0.429) (0.77) 
Multilateral alliance 
ratio it0* Alliance 
experience it0 
 
-0.009**  -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Constant 0.402 0.019 5.475*** 5.393*** 
 (1.103) (1.111) (1.768) (1.790) 
     
Overall R2 0.129 0.138 0.166 0.166 
Chi square 72.13*** 78.03*** 96.78 *** 96.70*** 
F-value for change 
in R2 
 5.245**  0.058 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 495 
   
 
  
113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Hypothesis 5b, DVs- On-Time Arrival and Involuntary Denied 
Boarding 
 Model 5 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 6 
On-time 
arrivalit1 
Model 7 
Involuntary 
denied 
boarding it1 
Model 8 
Involuntary 
denied 
boarding it1 
Control variables     
Airline type 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.172 0.339 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.187) (0.211) 
Firm size it1 (log) 0.002 -0.002 -0.573*** -0.613*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.090) (0.093) 
September 11th, 2001 0.048*** 0.047*** -0.245** -0.251** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.106) (0.106) 
No. of repeat 
allianceit1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) 
Independent variables     
Alliance portfolio 
size it0 (log) -0.007** -0.010*** -0.170*** -0.188*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.043) 
Alliance experience 
it0 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Multilateral alliance 
ratio it0 0.043*** 0.104*** -0.818*** -0.308 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.201) (0.361) 
Multilateral alliance 
ratio it0* Alliance 
experience it0 
 
0.001***  0.005* 
  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.693*** 0.719*** 7.280*** 7.493*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.827) (0.835) 
     
Overall R2 0.183   0.195 0.217 0.221 
Chi square 108.92*** 117.52*** 134.70*** 138.10*** 
F-value for change in 
R2 
 7.182***   2.871* 
 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
No. of observations = 495 
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Figure 5: Interaction Effect of Multilateral Alliance Ratio and Alliance 
Experience on On-Time Arrival 
 
 
 
On-time arrival 
The results of model 6 indicate that both the overall model (R2 = 0.195, Chi 
square = 117.52, p < 0.01) and the incremental change in R square (F = 7.182, p < 
0.01) were significant after multilateral alliance ratio* alliance experience was entered. 
Alliance portfolio size * alliance experience (beta = 0.001, p < 0.01) was significantly 
positively related to on-time arrival. The interaction plot presented in Figure 5 
suggests that alliance experience positively moderates the relationship between 
multilateral alliance ratio and on-time arrival such that as multilateral alliance ratio 
increases, the higher alliance experience, the higher on-time arrival rate. On the other 
hand, under the low alliance experience condition, as a multilateral alliance ratio 
increases, on-time arrival is associated with a slight decrease. This finding is 
consistent with H5b. 
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Figure 6: Interaction Effect of Multilateral Alliance Ratio and Alliance 
Experience on Involuntary Denied Boarding 
 
 
Involuntary denied boarding 
The results of model 8 indicate that the overall model (R2 = 0.221, Chi square 
= 138.10, p < 0.01) was significant and the incremental change in R square (F = 2.871, 
p < 0.10) was marginally significant after the interaction term of multilateral alliance 
ratio* alliance experience was entered. Alliance portfolio size*alliance experience 
(beta = 0.005, p > 0.10) was marginally positively related to involuntary denied 
boarding. Figure 6 plots the interaction and suggests that when alliance experience is 
high, increase in multilateral alliances is associated with higher involuntary denied 
boarding, thus inconsistent with H5b.  
In sum, H5 results indicate that as alliance experience increases, the effects of 
multilateral alliance ratio on consumer complaint and on-time arrival were improved, 
although involuntary denied boarding worsened.  
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 Chapter 4 presented the research methodology to collect the data and test the 
proposed hypotheses. A discussion of the results, managerial implications, and 
limitations and future research appears in the next chapter.  
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 CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
  
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section summarizes and 
discusses the results reported in chapter 4. The second section discusses managerial 
implications. In the third section, the limitations of this dissertation and implications 
for future research are discussed. Lastly, a conclusion is presented. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
This dissertation seeks to investigate the paradoxical effects of alliance 
participation, specifically, on customer service quality. In the context of the U.S. 
airline industry, managers are constantly pressured to enhance revenues and contain 
costs. Participating in alliance becomes an attractive strategy because alliances allow 
airlines to obtain benefits that are hard to obtain on their own. Yet, alliances are a 
complex organizational form that involves managing independent partners to 
accomplish interdependent alliance tasks, demanding substantial time and effort of the 
boundedly rational managers. Increased alliance participation may overtax managers’ 
capability in managing all aspects of customer service quality.  
Customer service quality is an important organizational outcome especially in 
the U.S. airline industry. As noted earlier, Luo (2007) reported that Southwest Airlines’ 
one percent increase in its customer complaints could lead to a $262 million loss in its 
stock returns, and American Airlines’ one percent decrease in customer complaints 
would result in a substantial gain of $138 million from the stock market. Given the 
importance of customer service quality, if negative alliance effects on customer 
service quality exist, then an alliance paradox emerges.  
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 Using longitudinal archival data of nine major U.S. airlines over a 20-year 
period, the effects of four alliance portfolio attributes (i.e., alliance portfolio size, 
multilateral alliance ratio, alliance partner country diversity, and alliance type) on 
customer service quality were first examined. Then, the moderating effects of alliance 
experience were tested. Table 17 provides a summary of the findings. 
Altogether, as shown in Table 17, out of the 24 predicted relationships 
between alliance portfolio attributes and the four dimensions of service quality, only 6 
were consistent with the hypotheses. Surprisingly, the results show that none of the 
hypothesized relationships were supported on all the four service quality dimensions. 
That is, although a hypothesis was supported on some service quality dimensions, 
inconsistent (opposite) or insignificant effects were reported on other dimensions. For 
example, as with H1, the effects of alliance portfolio size were confirmed on customer 
complaint and on-time arrival as predicted. However, the effects of alliance portfolio 
size on mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding were opposite to the H1 
prediction.  
This suggests that the relationships between alliance portfolio attributes and 
customer service quality are more complicated than initially proposed, thus creating a 
challenge in interpreting the results. In interpreting the results of H1-4, if there is at 
least one confirmed relationship, I interpret it as supported. This result interpretation 
strategy is consistent with the view of service as a total experience (Bowen & Ford, 
2002), which posits that service is a holistic experience in that a drop in any key 
aspect of a customer’s service experience leads to lower service quality experienced 
and perceived by customers. This is a valid argument. Suppose a passenger’s flight 
arrived on time and she was not denied boarding, she would still perceive low service 
quality if her baggage were lost.  
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 Similarly, in interpreting the results of H5a and H5b, if there is a result that 
suggests alliance experience negatively moderates the relationship between alliance 
portfolio size, multilateral alliance ratio and customer service quality, I interpret that 
hypothesis as not supported. This result interpretation strategy of H5 is also consistent 
with the view of service as a total experience because customers may have negative 
evaluations of their service experience if service deteriorates in some dimensions 
despite improvements in other dimensions. 
H1 predicted a negative relationship between alliance portfolio size and 
customer service quality. Even though alliance portfolio size was associated with 
service improvements in mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding, the 
results suggest that alliance portfolio size was associated with higher customer 
complaints and lower on-time arrival rate. Thus, H1 was supported. As opposed to 
other studies that found positive relationships between alliance portfolio size and firm 
performance (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Shan et al., 1994), this finding suggests that 
increasingly participating in a large number of alliances does constrain boundedly 
rational managers’ capabilities of dealing with the inherent alliance complexities and 
thus may end up with lower customer service quality.  
H2 predicted a negative relationship between multilateral alliance ratio and 
customer service quality. Surprisingly, this prediction was not supported on any of the 
four dimensions. This finding is inconsistent with the arguments that multilateral 
alliances are more complex to manage (Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
A possible explanation is that despite the inherent higher alliance complexities, 
airlines pay more attention to cooperating in multilateral alliance than in bilateral 
alliances due to higher level of alliance identification. Zeng and Chen proposed that 
“Alliance partners [in a multilateral alliance] will be less likely to cooperate with each 
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 other when they have a low rather than a high level of identification with the alliance” 
(p. 596). It is possible that airlines in multilateral alliances (e.g., SkyTeam, Star 
Alliance and Oneworld) have higher level identification with the alliance, and are 
more committed to alliance cooperation. 
H3 predicted that alliance partner country diversity is negatively related to 
customer service quality. The results show that even though alliance partner country 
diversity was not significantly related to customer service quality with respect to 
customer complaint, mishandled baggage, and on-time arrival, increasing partner 
country diversity was positively related to involuntary denied boarding. In line with 
the result interpretation strategy (i.e., service as a total experience), H3 was supported. 
This finding is consistent with the idea that increasing geographic scope creates 
higher management complexity and thus is associated with lower performance 
(Goerzen & Beamish, 2005).  
H4 predicted that channel-dominated alliance ratio is more negatively related 
to service quality than backward competitor-dominated alliance ratio. The results 
show that channel-dominated alliance ratio was more positively related to involuntary 
boarding, thus, confirming H4. This finding suggests that different types of alliances 
demand different levels of alliance management capabilities (Rothaermel & Deeds, 
2006), and thus are associated with different effects on customer service quality.  
H5a predicted that alliance experience positively moderates the relationship 
between alliance portfolio size and customer service quality. The results did not 
support H5a on any of the four dimensions. Moreover, the results suggest that as 
alliance experience increases, the negative effects of alliance experience on 
mishandled baggage became more severe. H5b predicted that alliance experience 
positively moderates the relationship between multilateral alliance ratio and customer 
121 
 
 service quality. Even though the results show that alliance experience improved the 
effects of multilateral alliance ratio on customer complaints and on-time arrival, the 
effect of multilateral alliance ratio on involuntary boarding worsened. In line with the 
“service as a total experience” approach, I interpret H5 as not supported. As opposed 
to other research that found positive effects of alliance experience (e.g., Hoang & 
Rothaermel, 2005; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), this finding indicates that customer 
service quality of airlines does not improve as their alliance experience accumulates 
over the years.  
Overall, three out of five hypotheses received support (i.e., H1, H3, and H4). 
This finding unveils the alliance paradox and suggests that alliance participation does 
cause harm to customer service quality. Specifically, increases in alliance portfolio 
size, partner country diversity and channel-dominated alliances (compared with 
backward competitor-dominated alliances) are associated with lower customer service 
quality.  
The next section discusses the limitations of this dissertation and continues 
with suggestions for future research.  
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Table 17: Summary of Results 
 
 Customer Service Quality 
 Customer 
complaints 
Mishandled  
baggage 
On-time 
arrival 
Involuntary 
denied 
boarding 
H1: Alliance portfolio 
size  consistent a 
 
inconsistent b 
 
consistent 
 
inconsistent 
H2: Multilateral alliance 
ratio  inconsistent insignificant c inconsistent inconsistent 
H3: Partner country 
diversity ratio insignificant insignificant insignificant consistent 
H4:Channel-dominated 
alliance ratio versus 
Backward 
competitor-dominated  
alliance ratio insignificant 
 
insignificant inconsistent consistent 
H5a: Alliance portfolio 
size *Alliance experience insignificant inconsistent inconsistent insignificant
H5b:Multilateral alliance 
ratio * Alliance 
experience consistent insignificant consistent inconsistent 
 
a: “consistent” denotes that the result is consistent with the hypothesized prediction, 
and lends support to the corresponding hypothesis. 
b: “inconsistent” denotes that the result is opposite to the hypothesized prediction. 
c: “insignificant” denotes that the relationship is not significant. 
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Limitations and Future research 
There are several limitations of this dissertation. First, given the data 
limitation, some potential interaction effects between the independent variables were 
not studied. For example, the multilateral competitor-dominated alliances may have 
different effects on service quality from multilateral channel-dominated alliances. 
Future research may study the interaction effects of the independent variables in this 
dissertation. Using the companies that are both available in American Customer 
Service Index (ACSI) database and SDC database may result in sufficient sample size 
and thus facilitate such inquiries.  
Second, the alliance experience moderating effects on partner country 
diversity and alliance type were not studied in this dissertation. Future study may 
investigate these two interactions. Also, the positive moderating effect of alliance 
experience on multilateral alliances was not confirmed. Probably, this happened 
because I did not specifically measure an airline’s experience with multilateral 
alliance. It may be possible that an airline’s alliance experience was only gained from 
dealing with bilateral alliances, thus was not effective in managing multilateral 
alliances.  
Third, given the data unavailability, I did not control for the effects of 
dedicated alliance functions. Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) argued that alliance 
experience is a crude proxy for alliance management capability. They found that firms 
with a dedicated alliance function had better performance. Future studies may 
investigate the effects of a dedicated alliance function on service quality.  
Fourth, this dissertation has encountered a challenge in interpreting the 
hypotheses due to the lack of a good weighting system of the four airline service 
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 dimensions. Even though Bowen and Headley (1991) developed a weighting system 
in their Airline Quality Ratings (AQR), their weighting system was based on a survey 
of airline managers’ perceptions of the importance of these dimensions. Thus, AQR 
does not accurately capture the service quality evaluation from the customers’ 
perspectives. As a result, future studies may first survey airline passengers to generate 
a weighting system that reflects customers’ evaluations of the importance of these 
four dimensions and then create a composite score of service quality.  
Fifth, despite the notable strengths of the SDC database, its alliance data may 
have compromised the analyses results. The alliance termination rate recorded in SDC 
database is relatively low in that only 5 out of 351 alliance announcements are 
alliance terminations. It is possible that airlines did not publicly announce their 
alliance terminations to avoid negative publicity. This lack of alliance termination 
data may have created severe threats to the alliance variables in this dissertation 
because some alliances are probably only short-term arms-length market transactions. 
Future research may involve interviews with the airline managers in the related 
functions to verify the durations of each alliance investigated in this dissertation.  
Sixth, researchers may conduct qualitative studies to help understand the 
findings of this dissertation. This dissertation is built on the theoretical premise of 
managers’ bounded rationality (March & Simon, 1958). The bounded rationality 
argument presupposes that the alliance participation dampens the various alliance 
benefits. Surprisingly, several analyses results are in the opposite direction to the 
hypothesized relationships (see Table 17). These inconsistent results suggest that 
bounded rationality is at work but insufficient to explain all the results reported in this 
dissertation. Future research may include qualitative studies such as interviews with 
airline managers to understand, for example, why multilateral alliances were 
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 associated with improvements in customer complaints, on-time arrival and 
involuntary denied boarding in testing H2, and why backward competitor-dominated 
alliances were more negatively related to on-time arrival than channel-dominated 
alliances in testing H4.  
Seventh, future research may use different regression procedures and time lags 
to validate the results reported in this dissertation. This dissertation used random 
panel regressions to test the hypotheses. Future research may use difference in 
difference regressions to detect the differential effects of alliances on service quality 
to corroborate the results reported in this dissertation. Also, future research may use 
different time lags such as 6 months or 12 months to compare the results because it is 
possible that under certain circumstances, the time lag of 3 months may not be long 
enough for the alliance effects to show on service quality.    
Lastly, since this dissertation relied on data from a single, unique industry, 
future research should cross-validate the results of this dissertation in other industries. 
As mentioned earlier, using data from ACSI and SDC databases is a viable approach. 
Managerial Implications  
 
Participating in alliances provides potential financial benefits such as revenue 
enhancements from greater market access and cost reductions. Yet, managers are 
constrained by their limited time and effort to manage the inherently complex alliance 
relationships. I hope to demonstrate that alliance participation may have unintended 
consequences, particularly as it relates to customer service quality, that managers 
should be aware of. As a result, managers should look at the full consequences of 
alliance participation, not just revenue enhancements or cost reductions, when 
contemplating alliance arrangements.  
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 The results of this dissertation indicated that although alliance participation 
provides critical benefits to the airlines, when the total number of existing alliances is 
high, the drop in customer service with respect to customer complaints and on-time 
arrival was observed. Therefore, managers should also pay more attention to 
mishandled baggage and involuntary denied boarding. Also, as airlines pursue 
international alliances, they should be more attentive to the issues related to 
involuntary denied boarding.  
Another implication for the airline managers is that channel-dominated alliance 
ratio has more detrimental effects on involuntary denied boarding than backward 
competitor-dominated alliance ratio. This suggests that managers should increase their 
interfirm coordination efforts with, for example, its ticket sales agents and ticket 
reservation websites to ensure accurate flight information.  
Also, since the moderating effects of alliance experience were not significant, 
airline managers should seek other more active means to manage alliances, such as 
setting up a dedicated function to coordinate alliance activities in order enhance 
alliance performance (Kale et al., 2002).  
Given the currently heightened pressure to lower costs and enhance revenues, 
participating in airline alliances is an attractive strategy even to ensure airline survival. 
Interestingly, this dissertation reported that participating in multilateral alliances does 
not hurt service quality. Thus, managers should consider participating more in 
multilateral alliances such as SkyTeam, Star Alliance and Oneworld than in bilateral 
alliances. 
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 Conclusion  
 
This dissertation makes three important contributions. First, this dissertation 
contributes to alliance research by exploring the potential dark side of alliance 
participation. The results unveiled an alliance paradox. Despite the potential alliance 
benefits, managing interdependent alliance activities performed by independent firms 
to produce and deliver products/services creates substantial alliance management 
complexity. Since managers are limited in their available time and effort, despite their 
best effort, as airlines increasingly participate in a large number of alliances, or form 
alliances with partners from diverse countries, boundedly rational managers fail to 
effectively manage alliances and end up with disappointing customer service quality.  
Second, this dissertation also contributes to services marketing research by 
studying alliance portfolio attributes as potential antecedents to service quality. As 
shown in the literature review, no empirical research to date has investigated the 
alliance portfolio effects on service quality. This dissertation suggests that the 
attributes of the multiple alliances that a firm currently manages have substantial 
effects on its service quality.  
Third, this dissertation provides the first examination of the moderating effects 
of alliance experience on the relationships between alliance portfolio attributes and 
customer service quality. Contrary to the findings reported in studies that use financial 
performance measures or production innovations as proxies for firm performance 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006), this dissertation shows that when customer service 
quality is brought into the mix of alliance research as a dependent variable, alliance 
experience does not have positive moderating effects.  
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